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ABSTRACT
Traditional wisdom suggests those who lose at trial for a criminal charge receive a
heftier prison sentence than those who plea bargain. Plea bargaining reduces strain on
the courts, expedites adjudication and may indicate the defendant’s propensity for
rehabilitation as they accept responsibility for their actions. Some ask why two people
charged with the same crime should receive different sentences based on the adjudication
method. The Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial. Innocent defendants may
decide to plead guilty for a sure short sentence rather than risk a trial conviction’s
lengthier one. This study using statistical procedures examined 12,786 adjudicated drug
crime cases between 2004 and 2007 from the Cook County Circuit Court in Illinois. It
sought to determine if adjudication method, plea bargain vs. trial conviction, predicted
prison sentence while controlling for independent variables such as ethnicity, gender,
statute violated, offense seriousness, quantity and interaction effects.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
For years, criminal justice experts have debated the existence of a trial tax with
regards to sentencing. Many believe that in the case of two defendants charged with the
same offense, all other conditions being equal, if one pleads guilty and the other goes to
trial and is found guilty, the latter will receive a stiffer sentence than the former. Ulmer
and Bradley (2006) define trial tax as occurring when, “. . . defendants are substantially
penalized if they exercise their right to a jury trial and then lose.” Bogira (2005) defines
trial tax as, “. . . the extra punishment a defendant may face merely by virtue of
exercising his right to trial.”
The term trial tax has even found its way into official court publications. Illinois
appellate courts have acknowledged its existence. The Alabama Sentencing Commission
has debated its constitutionality. Bogira (2005) claims the use of trial tax for means of
judicial efficiency declaring, “A guilty plea can be wrapped up in approximately 20
minutes, where a jury trial usually takes anywhere from two days to a week.”
Does the trial tax actually exist? Controlling for other factors, are defendants who
plead guilty more likely to receive leniency than those who go to trial? Among offenders
who plead guilty or go to trial for a drug offense, does a disparity exist in their sentences?
Assuming we find a disparity, does it remain if we control for other variables such as
specific crimes, offense severity, ethnicity or gender?
1
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This study will examine adjudication data from the Circuit Court of Cook County.
The arrest, charge and disposition records of almost 13,000 defendants adjudicated for
drug related offenses will be analyzed. Statistical analyses will be run to check for
differences between groups based on the above noted variables.
The results of this dissertation may be used for policy development related to the
alleged penalization of the constitutional right to a jury trial. It may also serve as the
foundation for a future, more encompassing study of the same topic – perhaps Illinois
wide or including other states. This project will be performed in conjunction with and
receive assistance from the Institute for Metropolitan Affairs, a public policy institute
operating within Roosevelt University.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The primary issue for this research relates to whether a trial tax exists, or not.
Anecdotal evidence supports the notion that, everything else being equal, those who
plead guilty for crime x will receive a lighter sentence than those who got to trial and are
then convicted of crime x, hence the term trial tax. The defendant is enticed to accept the
pact – plead guilty and receive a great bargain, hence, plea bargain. However, if the
criminally charged all have a constitutional right to trial why should they be penalized for
exercising that right versus accepting a plea bargain? This dissertation will examine the
difference, if any, between convicts who went to trial to those who plea bargained. The
importance of this dissertation lies with the question of disparity in sentencing between
trial and plea bargain convicts. If no inequality is found, the concerns over the use of a
trial tax disappear. If those who plea bargain receive a statistically significant lesser
sentence, however, then innocents may be far more likely to plead guilty to avoid a
lengthy prison term. Plea bargaining becomes a way of trading the risk of a ten year
sentence for the certainty of three to five, regardless of guilt. We will see the riskreduction theme run throughout this literature review.
The oldest recorded use of a form of plea bargaining involves Galileo, the 15th
century Italian astronomer. In 1633, he avoided death via the Inquisition by pleading
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guilty to supporting Copernicus’ heliocentric theory and agreeing to publicly deny said
theory. The judges gave him house arrest and he agreed to recite weekly, penitent
psalms, which was a better deal than being burned alive. While far removed from
modern American courts, we see the seeds of the notion that pleading guilty upfront
results in a lighter punishment.
The U.S. Supreme Court declared plea bargaining to be a legitimate legal tool via
two landmark cases, Brady vs. United States and Santobello vs. United States. In Brady,
the Court noted that a plea helped hold down costs and expedited the judicial docket. In
the same case it declared that defendants were entitled to “limiting the probable penalty”
by pleading guilty. In Santobello, the Court asserted this acceptance of responsibility
indicated a better chance for rehabilitation and should therefore be encouraged.
However, there is no research cited in the case supporting this conclusion. Neither case,
however, discussed the constitutional propriety of how large the disparity in sentences
may be, using plea bargains when the prosecution’s case was weak or “bargaining down”
to a lesser charge. In a sweeping 1969 decision, Boykin vs. Alabama, the Court declared
that Constitutional right to a jury trial may be waived only if the defendant voluntarily
accepted said plea bargain. Boykin, represented by a public defender, never formally,
with his own words, accepted a plea bargain for the five robbery charges against him. He
and his attorney remained silent while the prosecution presented the plea. The trial judge
simply entered the plea without asking Boykin if he understood and accepted it. The
Court reversed the conviction even though Boykin’s attorney did not object to the plea.
Bargaining “down” came into being as a result of sentence guidelines and
mandatory minimums. According to Kinsley (2002) with sentencing discretion limited or
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removed entirely by the mandatory minimums, prosecutors found it necessary to allow
defendants to plea to a lesser charge in order to get the lesser sentence. He notes that
many have argued that when a guilty person plea bargains to a lesser charge, it permits
the defendant to escape the legal consequences of their crimes. If they go to trial and are
convicted, they will be sentenced according the actual crime committed, not a less serious
offence. The flip-side of this action is those charged, but innocent, may plead guilty
simply to avoid the continued trauma associated with a criminal charge or to avoid or
limit a prison term.
We must study plea bargains because of their extensive use and potential for
abuse. Kinsley (2002) reports that 95% of all criminal cases in the United States are
settled by plea bargain.
And when, as part of a plea bargain, innocent people confess to a crime
they did not commit, that isn't a breakdown of the system. It is the system
working exactly as it is supposed to. If you're the suspect, sometimes this
means agreeing with the prosecutor that you will confess to jaywalking
when you're really guilty of armed robbery.
Fisher (2003) quotes University of Chicago law professor Albert Alschuler as
declaring the rate to be around 90%. The King (2005) study, discussed in this review,
places the figure at around 98%. While precise figures are not available, legal experts
agree that the vast majority of criminal cases are settled by the use of plea bargaining.
Per Fisher (2003), the earliest use of plea bargains in the United States is found in
the late 18th century, Middlesex County, Massachusetts. He found strikingly similar
elements to what we hear today – overburdened and underfunded courts, lack of judicial
and law enforcement resources, and those with a sufficient “purse” being able to hire the
best lawyers. In addition, these early plea bargains came from criminal charges against
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victimless crimes such as selling or drinking alcohol. “The Middlesex County prosecutor
devised a system whereby multiple charges for selling liquor without a license would be
dropped to one charge, to which defendants would plead nollo contendere [no contest]
and be sentenced to a pre-determined fine and court costs.” Critics of the modern war on
drugs would no doubt sympathize with their 18th century counterpart critics.
Fisher (2003) claims that by 1900 the criticism of what we today call a trial tax
had taken root as the severity of a trial sentence ranged from twice to three times as long
as those handed down after a plea bargain for the same crime. Does the trial tax exist? If
so, does this disparity affect one group, such as ethnicity or gender, more than another?
What types of formal research have been conducted to date?
Langer (2006) dealt solely with the improper use of plea bargains by prosecutors
in terms of violating jurisdictional penal codes covering plea bargain rules and
procedures. Langer performed qualitative, document analysis research by studying
landmark cases, state and federal, in which Constitutional issues of lack of due process,
as it relates to prosecutorial discretion, was the dominant if not sole ground for the case.
He categorized the rights violations into four groups: Right to a Hearing and Knowing the
Evidence, Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, Right Against Self-incrimination and the
Right to an Impartial Adjudicator.
Langer (2006) coined terms for two primary categories of defendants being
denied due process via a prosecutor’s authority. He refers to the “de facto unilateral
adjudication” in which prosecutors, effectively, solely decide guilt or innocence via
coercive plea proposals. As prosecutors decide charges, and in effect sentences if found
guilty, the sentence differential often leaves the accused with no reasonable choice other
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than to accept guilt. In addition, he describes what he labeled “de facto bilateral
adjudication” where both prosecution and defense sidestep the courts to adjudicate by
mutual consent. Langer argues that the former violates our fundamental due process
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. However, as previously noted, the U.S. Supreme
Court sanctioned the waiving of Constitutional rights via Boykin vs. Alabama, if the
accused voluntarily accepts the plea bargain.
By threatening to take cases to trial where no reasonable jury would find guilt or
charging defendants (guilty or not) with crimes that do not reflect the incident in
question, prosecutors have created what Langer (2006) calls the informal prosecutorial
adjudication system. The quintessential example remains sexual assault versus assault.
A prosecutor has virtually no case against a defendant charged with rape. He offers to
reduce the charge to assault with a sentence of probation if the accused pleads guilty.
Granted, prosecutors cannot force a defendant to accept said plea bargain but this does
not change the adjudicatory nature of this arrangement. Once again, however, the U.S.
Supreme Court has authorized the process by the case Brady vs. United States, actually
stating that defendants were entitled to “limit the probable penalty.” Regardless, this
unchecked power of prosecutors, Langer asserts, has led to uncountable numbers of
coercive plea bargains.
Bibas (2004) examined the outcomes of plea bargaining in civil litigation and
found results similar to Langer (2006). We see again this notion of hedging a bet with
regards to a result. The defendant may truly owe $100,000 but the plaintiff, unwilling to
risk a zero dollar judgment, accepts the $50,000. Conversely, the defendant may owe
nothing, but, fearing a large judgment, agrees to pay the smaller amount. Similar to
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Langer’s concerns over defacto bilateral adjudication, effectively, the attorneys decide
the outcome without input from the judge or jury.
Bibas (2004) provides a study filled with both actual and hypothetical cases for
illustration. Typical examples include a plaintiff claiming $100,000 in damages with a
jury only 50% likely to find the defendant negligent. Both parties should therefore settle
for $50,000. Similar to Langer (2006), Bibas used document analysis by reviewing high
profile civil cases across the United States for his material. He also interviewed attorneys
from each side, plaintiff and defendant, asking non-case-specific questions about the
process and how the parties ultimately settled.
This study proved an interesting contrast to the criminal case related research
addressed elsewhere. Bibas (2004) makes little mention of Constitutional rights, loss of
liberty or coercion by prosecutors. While he does note similarities between criminal plea
bargains and settling tort cases, he spends most of the research considering the similarity
between the self-correcting market place and logic behind plea agreements similar to the
above mentioned example. While he reviews bargaining for the best financial bargain,
the other studies dealt with bargaining over someone’s liberty.
Bibas (2004) notes the similarities, such as plea bargaining being hidden from
public view, to the criminal court’s use of plea bargains. Be it neighbors feuding over a
damaged lawn or a multi-billion dollar tort claim, as the discussion and settlement occurs
outside of the courtroom the public will never know what transpired. Unlike a criminal
case, however, they will not even know the outcome. In criminal cases, the sentence
becomes public record regardless of the adjudication method. In a civil case settled
outside of court, only each party knows the outcome. Another difference is that there are
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no public defenders in the civil arena. An indigent criminal defendant may receive a
defense attorney, paid a straight salary, to represent 10 or 100 clients. Clearly that
attorney has personal incentive to plea bargain. That scenario would not exist in a tort
claim where counsel is paid via a retainer or even a percentage of recovered funds.
Finkelstein (1975) found evidence of another unanticipated cost of plea
bargaining, the “implicit rate of non-conviction” – the proportion of defendants pleading
guilty who, in all probability, would have not been convicted in a trial. The researcher
determined this unobservable variable by creating a conviction probability. If there exists
two federal districts with the prosecutors from one always seeking maximum sentences
and the other not doing so, logically, defendants in the first district are more likely to plea
bargain than those in the second. If every defendant pleading guilty would have been
convicted at trial, it stands to reason that, over time, the proportion of acquittals between
the two districts would be relatively equal. If, however, the first district sees substantially
fewer acquittals than the second, undoubtedly, some of the plea bargaining defendants in
the first district would not have been convicted if they had gone to trial. The study tested
for a statistically significant correlation between the percentage of plea bargains and
acquittal probabilities.
The author says little about where he obtained the records or how he coded them.
He does note that the data came from the Annual Reports of the Attorney General.
Beyond that he notes two limitations to the study. First, he did not control for the variety
of criminal cases per district. If one district’s docket saw a disproportionate amount of a
particular type of crime, that may skew the results. In addition, presumably those
districts more apt to plea bargain, focused their resources on trials and were more likely
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to obtain a conviction because they had the time and money to properly litigate. His
study dealt only with federal cases – the situation may be different in state criminal
courts.
Using the Annual Reports of the Attorney General from the twenty-nine federal
district courts, Finkelstein (1975) found a statistically significant, strong negative
correlation between the percentage of non-convictions (the defendant would probably
have been acquitted if they went to trial) to the percentage of guilty pleas. It should be
noted that the data in each district was analyzed in the aggregate to provide for a larger
sample and greater stability. The data points do not make a perfect line. This could be
interpreted as indicating that the non-conviction rate is influenced by variables other than
plea bargain rates. However, the correlation equaled -0.849. Using the least squares
technique produced a -0.691 slope indicating a non-conviction rate of about 69%.
Finkelstein calls this evidence that, “. . . pressures to plead guilty have been used to
secure convictions that could not otherwise be obtained.” (Finkelstein, p. 309)
Finkelstein (1975) comments on Boykin vs. Alabama, where the U.S. Supreme
Court said a defendant may waive his right to a jury trial only if it is done so voluntarily.
He notes that while the Court approved this practice, it did so, “. . . only on the
assumption that defendants who were convicted on the basis of negotiated pleas of guilt
would have been convicted had they elected to stand trial.” (Finkelstein, p. 293) The
above data seems to refute that point. Finkelstein goes on to note the temptation
defendants, undoubtedly some innocent, must feel to accept a plea – again, we see
evidence of bet hedging. The accused accepts a lower sentence in exchange for avoiding
a possible, long sentence. He notes, “. . . prosecutors may be using threats of lengthy
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sentences and other plea inducing practices to obtain convictions in case in which the
government’s evidence is quite insubstantial.” (Finkelstein, p. 293)
Moreover, Finkelstein (1975) argues that, what Langer (2006) would call
unilateral defacto adjudication, that is, the prosecutor coercing a plea bargain, negates
Boykin vs. Alabama in that, “. . . when strong pressure is necessary to compel a
confession in a weak case, the prosecutor’s zeal to obtain a conviction by “consent”
begins to collide with the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination.” (Finkelstein,
p. 294) Finkelstein also agrees with Langer’s assessment in that, “It appears that
informal, and less visible, administrative practices have been used to induce convictions
by “consent” in a significant number of cases in which the protections of the formal
system would have precluded a condemnation.” (Finkelstein, p. 311)
The Finkelstein data analysis for the 1908 to 1928 period found a statistically
significant correlation of -0.812. The correlation value is similar to the 1970 – 1974
dataset, but, the slope of the least squares line equaled -0.265 meaning that the nonconviction rate equaled about 26.5%. This slope is only 38% of the value of the first
dataset indicating that while plea bargains resulted in the conviction of those who may
otherwise have been acquitted, the impact was not as great for that time frame. The 1954
– 1974 dataset revealed a striking correlation of -0.977 with a slope of least squares equal
to -0.791 which is higher than the percentage for 1970 – 1974.
It should be noted that Finkelstein (1975) does agree with a comment from Brady
vs. United States with regards to plea bargains expediting the court docket and saving
funds. He wrote, “If insistence on a trial cost nothing, presumably few of the accused
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would plead guilty and forgo the chance for a dismissal or acquittal.” (Finkelstein, p.
293)
The Finkelstein (1975) study offers compelling evidence that many who plead
guilty may actually have been acquitted at trial. Of course, acquittal does not mean they
are innocent. Perhaps the guilty received a deserved conviction; perhaps some innocent
people bent to the pressure of a prosecutor. The next step would be to determine if a
disparity truly exists for sentencing of plea bargained defendants and those who go to
trial.
Ulmer and Bradley (2006) focus on violent crimes and the practice of plea
bargaining. They did this because violent crime charges are more than twice as likely to
go to trial, roughly 7%, versus 3% overall, in Pennsylvania. As previously noted by
Fisher (2003), King (2005) and Kinsley (2002), the vast majority of charges are settled by
plea bargains.
Using data from 1997 to 2000 from the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing
(PCS), their study tested eight hypotheses, two of which mirrored the research in this
dissertation. One hypothesis declared, “Among convicted defendants, those convicted by
jury trial will be sentenced more severely than those convicted by guilty plea” (Ulmer &
Bradley, 2006, p. 637). Another sought to test whether or not, “The jury trial penalty . . .
will be significantly greater among those with more extensive prior criminal records”
(Ulmer & Bradley, p. 639). The other hypotheses dealt with influence of course
caseloads on plea bargaining and issues related to violent crimes, neither of which will
play a part in this research.
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Ulmer & Bradley (2006) used sentence length as the dependent variable, coded as
probation or incarceration with the number of months and offense severity, prior record,
plea bargain and trial (bench or jury) as the independent variables. Their large dataset of
n = 8,585 allowed for the employment of Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) to create
predictor models and search for group variations using separate but interrelated units of
analysis. Level 1, individual case / defendant, characteristics were nested and could
interact with Level 2, county courts, individual and cross-county (statewide) outcomes,
that is, the sentence length.
The authors admitted several limitations to their study, such as not measuring
variables such as the socio-economic status of the subjects, whether they had public or
private defense attorneys, victim characteristics (assuming harsher sentences if a child,
female or elderly person fell target) or pretrial release status. Ulmer and Bradley (2006)
noted that individuals held in jail, awaiting adjudication, often did not serve prison time.
That is, if someone cannot afford or does not receive bail and they remain in jail for a
significant period of time, if they would have received a sentence of X months, the judge
could simply release them with time served. While that time would count towards the
sentence if the defendant were sentenced to additional time, it does not appear in the
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing dataset as incarceration time. Obviously, the
fact that they studied data from only one state limits the results.
The results of this study support the existence of a trial tax. Ulmer and Bradley
(2006) found that, “. . . the odds of incarceration following a bench trial are roughly 2.2
times the odds for guilty plea, while a jury trial conviction has roughly 2.7 times the
incarceration odds of a guilty plea” (Ulmer & Bradley, p. 650). They concluded that,
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“Overall, then, conviction by trial, especially jury trial, carries a meaningful additional
sentencing penalty . . .” (Ulmer & Bradley, p. 650).
The results of this study do support the hypothesis that criminal history plays a
role in the sentence depending on whether or not the defendant pleas or goes to trial;
however, not in the correlation one might expect. Ulmer and Bradley (2006) determined
that, “. . . the jury trial penalty decreases as the prior record score of the defendant
increases” (Ulmer & Bradley, p. 653). The authors ran separate HLM models to compare
jury trial sentencing results for subjects with high criminal record scores to those with
low criminal record scores. The authors found that the difference between having many
prior convictions and going to trial or not was not statistically significant in terms of the
odds of incarceration. However, subjects with low criminal record scores had 3.5 times
the probability of incarceration if they had chosen a trial vs. plea bargain. Oddly, the jury
trial tax seemed heavier for subjects with less criminal histories than those with an
extensive record.
Agreeing with Finkelstein (1975) and Brady vs. United States, the authors note
that, “Most researchers argue that rewarding those who plead guilty and penalizing those
who lose at trial reflects the need for efficiency in case processing.” (Ulmer & Bradley,
2006, p. 635) However, unlike Finkelstein, the authors offer support for this scenario in
that, “Rewarding those who plead guilty with lighter sentences is widely seen as
necessary to encourage defendants’ ‘remorse,’ ‘acceptance of responsibility’ for crimes . .
. losing [at trial] may signal a defendant’s lack of remorse, and therefore greater
blameworthiness, to judges.” (Ulmer & Bradley, p. 636) Similar to Santobello vs. United
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States, accepting responsibility may be evidence of a better chance of rehabilitation, thus,
the lighter sentence.
Johnson (2003) used the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing (PCS) data to
focus on departures from sentencing guidelines, not the complete sentence itself, and then
looked for differences between groups, depending on the type of conviction. A
departure, in criminal sentencing terminology, refers to an allowed increase or decrease
in a sentence range established by guidelines or a sentence set by statute. For example, if
a guideline calls for a minimum sentence of x months for a crime, the judge may be
allowed to assign a downward departure of y months for showing remorse and
acceptance of responsibility. That defendant’s sentence would then be x – y months. Or,
if the maximum sentence for some crime equaled x months, but the convicted person
acted as ring-leader, the judge may be allowed to assign an upward departure of y
months. The sentence then becomes x + y months.
The author used PCS data from 1996 – 1998 to examine the likelihood of
receiving a sentence that departs from the guidelines. He then searched for disparities
based on conviction modes and ethnicity. The author defined the four modes as nonnegotiated pleas where the accused pleads guilty without discussion, negotiated pleas
where the defense and prosecution negotiated a plea agreement, bench trials where the
case was tried by the judge and jury trials where a panel of jurors decided to convict or
not.
The researcher formed six hypotheses. The first sought to test the question of
sentence outcome disparity based on ethnicity. The second focused on sentence disparity
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for those who went to trial (regardless of type) to those who plead guilty (regardless of
type). For analysis he compared downward departure vs. standard sentence with n =
45,594 and upward departure vs. standard sentence with n = 109,931. Thus, the
dependent variable model used a tri-variable that distinguished the sentences as having a
downward departure, no departure (standard sentence) and upward departure. The
independent variables were the aforementioned modes of conviction. There were a small
number of cases in the dataset listed as “other” or “no contest” but these were not
included due to the small number of occurrences. The seriousness of the offense was
controlled by using an Offense Gravity Score (OGS) and Prior Record Score (PRS). The
OGS measures the seriousness of the offense on a scale of one to thirteen, one being least
serious and thirteen being the most. The PRS measures the prior criminality of the
defendant by considering the number and severity of past convictions on a scale of one to
eight, one being “least criminality” and eight being “most criminality” such as repeat,
violent offenders.
Johnson (2003) found that overall, Blacks had a 25% less chance of receiving a
downward departure than whites and Hispanics were 56% less likely than whites to
receive this benefit. In addition, older and female offenders, regardless of ethnicity, were
more likely to receive a downward departure than their younger counterparts.
Criminal history also affected the sentence to differing degrees, based on the
mode of conviction. An increase in criminal history of five units (on the PRS scale)
increased the odds of a downward departure by 1.72 overall, while a non-negotiated plea
multiplied the odds by 3.69. Regardless, as with Ulmer and Bradley (2006), those with
more criminal experience were more likely to receive a shorter sentence.
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The results for conviction modes revealed the following. Conviction by jury trial
increased the chances of an upward departure by 85%, while a negotiated plea bargain
decreased the odds of an upward departure by only 20%. Conviction at a bench trial
decreased the odds of an upward departure by 56%, while conviction at a jury trial
decreased said odds by 62%. In summary, “For downward departure decisions,
negotiating a plea increased the likelihood of departure, while going to bench or jury trial
decreased the likelihood.” (Johnson, 2003, p. 480) In addition, “For upward departure
decisions, negotiating a plea reduced the likelihood of departure while going to jury trial
increased it.” (Johnson, p. 480) However, this finding did not hold true for bench trials
in the upward analysis. The author suggested examining this curiosity in future research.
While Bibas (2004) noted that in civil cases settled by consent no documentation
exists for the settlement, Johnson (2003) declared that no formal research had been
performed on the prosecutor as an “actor” in the courtroom setting with regards to plea
bargaining. He stated that while convictions and sentences became part of the court
record, the actual bargaining done by prosecutor and defense attorney was not recorded
and, thereby, subject to scrutiny. He also concurred with Langer’s (2006) unilateral and
bilateral defacto adjudication theory in that, “Because prosecutors utilize their own
judgment when negotiating sentencing recommendations in exchange for guilty pleas,
and because judges almost always adhere to these recommendations, prosecutors exercise
more sentencing discretion than judges for these cases.” (Johnson, p. 456)
Via the likelihood of receiving a downward departure, or not, Johnson (2003)
found evidence of the trial tax’s existence. Unlike Langer (2006), Bibas (2004) and
Finkelstein (1975), he did not comment on the implications such as pleading for risk
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reduction or the possibility of innocents pleading guilty due to prosecutorial coercion.
Johnson provided a straightforward, quantitative project on upward and downward
departure disparities.
King (2005) directly studies the disparity between trial and plea bargain
sentencing, primarily focusing on the impact of sentencing guidelines and the variation
that still exists, even within jurisdictions, for sentences, period. King notes that for years
reformers have attempted to regulate sentence disparity for like offenders on legal issues
to eliminate the disparity for non-legal factors such as ethnicity or gender. Her research
focused on what she termed “process discounts”, sentence differences for the same
offense whether conviction occurred by trail (jury or bench) or plea bargain, in five states
using sentencing guidelines. As a point of interest, she notes that only the federal
criminal justice system, via the U.S. Sentencing Commission, acknowledges the plea
bargain sentence discount for “acceptance of responsibility”. Similar to Ulmer &
Bradley (2006), she notes that pleading guilty may be evidence of the defendant’s
reduced likelihood to be a repeat offender and, as such, should be rewarded with a lighter
sentence. She also declares that no state sentencing guidelines formally recognize plea
bargains.
To collect data, King (2005) used a mixed-methods approach by obtaining
archival sentencing data and conducting a series of telephone interviews with prosecutors
and defense attorneys from Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Pennsylvania and Washington.
These states were selected as they had established judicial sentencing guidelines, a
sizeable number of bench trials and available data. Her study hypothesized that,
controlling for other factors, sentences for the same crime would be most severe for jury
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trials, then bench trials, then plea bargains, respectively. Some reasons for sentence
disparity remain fundamental. Typically, a direct correlation exists between the number
of past convictions and sentence severity for the most recent crime. Other potential
reasons remain overtly improper – ethnicity being the prime example.
The interviews revealed some expected results with regards to the prosecutors’
and defense attorneys’ perceptions. Almost every subject agreed with the idea that a jury
trial yields the harshest sentence, plea bargain yields softest sentence and that a bench
trial produces a “middle” sentence model. They all agreed that the primary impetus for
plea bargaining is to provide an incentive to avoid costly, for the courts, trials.
Unexpected information arose as well, however. King (2005) noted that some factors,
relating to higher sentences for trial convictions cannot be controlled for, such as a
judge’s emotional reaction to victim testimony, public scrutiny that accompanies trials, or
the “human” perspective of the judge that going to trail demonstrates an inherent lack of
remorse on the defendant’s part.
Of the five states studied, only Washington failed to show a statistically
significant difference that mirrored the predicted model. The other four, to varying
degrees, offer substantial sentence “discounts” to defendants who plead guilty over those
who go to trial. Those who do not plead guilty but accept a bench trial fare only slightly
better, on average, than those who choose a jury trial. King (2005) found, “. . . a
significant plea discount – the difference between the average sentence given after a
guilty verdict and the average sentence given after a guilty plea for the same offense . . .
but waiving a jury in favor of a bench trial has less consistent punishment consequences.”
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King (2005), just as do Langer (2006) and Johnson (2003), notes the one-way
street often associated with prosecutor offered plea bargains to reduce the sentence by
pleading to a less severe crime. She notes that, “. . . prosecutorial discretion in charging,
which produces vast differences in the punishment of similarly situated offenders, even
where sentencing guidelines limit sentence disparity per charge (King, p. 960).”
Plea bargaining began as a means to lessen the burden on courts. In 1970 the U.S.
Supreme Court declared, via Brady vs. United States, that plea bargains reduce the
expense of running courts and speed up the dockets. After all, if the prosecution’s case is
so strong why bother with a trial if the defendant waives that right? By Boykin vs.
Alabama, the Court asserted that those charged may indeed waive Constitutional rights,
so long as it is done voluntarily. However, Langer (2006) noted the appearance of de
facto adjudication where prosecutors effectively become the judge and jury by coercive
or enticing plea offers. Langer felt this violated the fundamental right to due process.
The U.S. Supreme Court suggested that this willingness to accept responsibility for a
crime may indicate a better chance at rehabilitation. A decision by the Court in 1971,
Santobello vs. United States, indicated that accepting a plea bargain may be a good sign
that a defendant was ready to be reformed.
Like many good ideas, however, it seems to have had unintended consequences.
Fisher (2003), King (2005) and Kinsley (2002) all state that less than 10% of all
convictions are the result of a trial. To avoid the chance of prison, i.e. avoid the risk,
innocents may plead guilty. While this is bad enough, it also means the guilty party
remains free. However, in Brady vs. United States, the Court openly acknowledges that
plea bargains “limit the probability of penalty”. Both Langer (2006) and Bibas (2004)
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detail the enticement of hedging bets in terms of a consequence. Langer notes the
injustice to the victims via examples such as a sexual assault charge being changed to
simple assault. Here we see how prosecutors circumnavigate minimum sentencing laws
– to entice the rapist to plea bargain; in order to guarantee a shorter sentence, the
prosecutor reduces the charges. Here we see his de facto adjudication in play. If truly
guilty, why should the convict get a bargain with a reduced charge and/or sentence? If
the Constitution guarantees a jury trial, should the accused be penalized if convicted, via
sentence, for exercising that right?
The primary question of whether or not plea bargains result in statistically
significant different sentences compared to those who are convicted at trial will be
studied. We have seen how Fisher (2003) declares the trial tax to be as much as two to
three times the sentence compared to plea bargaining. Finkelstein (1975) found an
implicit rate of non-conviction of 69% - that is, per his data, 69% of those who plead
guilty probably would have not been convicted by a jury. Ulmer & Bradley (2006) found
that a jury trial has 2.7 times the chance of resulting in incarceration than a plea bargain.
Johnson (2003) stated that a jury trial conviction increased the chances of an upward
sentence departure by 85%, while plea bargaining actually decreased the odds of getting
an upward departure by 20%. Four out of five states studied by King (2005) found a
statistically significant increase in sentences for those going to trail compared to those
who plea bargained.
This dissertation will focus on drug crimes committed in Cook County, Illinois
and whether or not those who went to trial and were found guilty received a harsher
sentence than those who accepted a plea bargain. While the sentence received will serve
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as the dependent variable, numerous independent variables will be controlled for to look
for differences. Based on analysis performed by studies noted in this literature review,
the key independent variables seem to be trial vs. plea bargain, specific offense, offense
severity, ethnicity and gender. Unfortunately, the dataset to be received from the Circuit
Court of Cook County will not contain information regarding the defendant’s criminal
history. As such, that variable will not be considered in this study.
The specific crime as defined by Illinois statute, gender, ethnicity and offense
severity will be employed to search for differences between groups. We must study these
variables to search for disparity in sentencing based on what group a subject may belong.
This may suggest discrimination and point out the need for future research.
This can only be accomplished by knowing the statute a defendant has been
charged with violating. The scope of this study will be limited to the twenty-five drug
statutes found in Table 2. The inclusion of initial charge and amended charge will reveal
if a defendant has “plead down” to a lesser charge or simply plead guilty to the initial
crime with which he had been charged. For example, a defendant may have an initial
charge of violating statute 720 ILCS 570/402 (a) (1) (B), 100 – 399 grams of heroin. If
the record shows an amended charge of violating statute 720 ILCS 570/402 (a) (1) (A),
15 – 99 grams of heroin, and a plea bargain, this indicates a plea down to a lesser charge
to receive a lighter sentence.
The groups, in aggregate, will be those convicted by plea bargain and those
convicted by jury trial. However, these groups may be analyzed further by the specific
offense, the offense severity, gender and ethnicity. For example, a statistically significant
difference may or may not exist for the whole sample, but, the study will investigate for
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differences between genders, ethnicity, etc. A sub-question may be to investigate
whether those convicted of a specific crime, plead guilty, received a statistically
significant difference in sentence based on gender, ethnicity, etc.
From 1980 to 2005, the U.S. prison population increased six-fold from 250,000 to
1,500,000 inmates. In 2006, the most recent year for which Department of Justice,
Bureau of Justice Statistics are available, over 7,000,000 Americans, about 2.5%, were
under some form of correctional supervision such as incarceration, jail (awaiting
adjudication), probation or parole. Approximately 70% were convicted of a drug related
crime. By the end of 2006, the female inmate population, state and federal, increased
2.6% from 2005 while the male population increased by 1.9%. Females made up 7% of
all U.S. inmates. African-American females were twice as likely as Hispanic females,
and three times as likely as White females, to be incarcerated.
One possible use of the results of this research might be to determine an eligible
pool for implementation of a statewide treatment plan alternative to incarceration. At this
time, the Cook County State’s Attorney maintains that the majority of those convicted of
drug possession have accepted plea agreements from sales offenses. In order to
determine the potential cost savings of treatment for those charged with drug possession
offenses and incarcerated for these offenses, analysis of plea bargaining is required.
This research will be a part of Drug Possession Impact Study by the Institute for
Metropolitan Affairs scheduled for a late 2010 publication. It will study the criminal
justice system’s changing impact on Chicago’s non-violent drug offenders in a
comprehensive, systematic manner to create research-informed policies for increased,
adequate and appropriate drug treatment.

CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
The primary issue for this research relates to whether a trial tax exists for
defendants charged with drug crimes in Cook County, Illinois. Finkelstein (1975),
Johnson (2003), King (2005), Langer (2006) and Ulmer and Bradley (2006) all declared
that everything else being equal, those who plead guilty of a certain crime will receive a
lighter sentence than those who got to trial and are convicted of the same crime; hence
the term trial tax.
Does the trial tax exist in Cook County – that is, are defendants who plead guilty
more likely to receive leniency than those convicted at trial? Assuming a disparity is
discovered, does it remain when controlling for other variables such as offense type,
offense severity, ethnicity or gender?
Data Description
This study examined adjudication data from the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois. The charge and disposition records of almost 13,000 defendants sentenced for
drug related offenses were analyzed.
Data was requested, via the Freedom of Information Act, from the Cook County
Circuit Court for drug-related offenses. The court tracks adjudication, along with other
identifiers, by Illinois Statute. Subjects must have been charged between 2004 and 2006
with final disposition occurring no later than 2007.
24
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Data Permissions
All data obtained is publicly available through the Freedom of Information Act.
Case numbers were used as identifiers for the adjudication data. Names, social security
numbers, driver’s license numbers or any other personal information were not part of the
dataset. There is no way to identify a specific individual with a specific case from the
dataset short of going to a Cook County courthouse and requesting to see the file for a
specific criminal case using the case number provided. Such records, however, are public
information. Anyone may search criminal records by name or case number at any Cook
County courthouse.
The investigation is limited to adjudication data. Adjudication data from the
Circuit Court of Cook County is not comparable to Illinois Department of Corrections
(IDOC) prisons admission data which represents anyone entering prison in a given year.
Since violent offenders, for example, generally get longer sentences, they tend to
represent more of the total prison population at any given time. But since violent
offenders are less common than drug offenders, they make up much less of the
population entering prison at any point in time.
Variables in Dataset
Dependent Variables
The single dependent variable studied was “sentence” – the amount of prison time
an offender must serve for a crime. Cook County judges sentence offenders to a
minimum amount of time, expressed in months, to the custody of IDOC. Occasionally
judges also impose a maximum term. Inmates are frequently released prior to the
minimum sentence in accordance with IDOC regulations. Illinois currently uses the “day
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for a day” good behavior policy. For every day of the sentence an inmate maintains good
behavior, he or she gets one day reduction in their sentence. In addition, if they are
eligible for and complete substance abuse or vocational/employment training they may
receive additional time off. It would be impossible to track each convict’s actual
incarceration time without comparing individual case numbers. The IDOC often
determines actual incarceration time, but for this study the judge’s minimum month
sentence was used.
Independent Variables
Independent variables were controlled for and used to predict the outcome, or
dependent variable, sentence. Sentences may vary by whether the defendant plea
bargained or went to trial, the offense severity, ethnicity, gender and interaction effects.
The following table lists the independent variables.
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Table 1
Independent Variables______________________
1. Conviction Mode – Jury Trial or Plea Bargain
2. Gender
3. Ethnicity
4. Seriousness – Possession or Sales
5. Quantity (<15g or ≥15g)
7. Gender * Conviction Mode
8. Ethnicity * Possession vs. Sales
9. Ethnicity * Quantity
______________________________________

Convictions and sentences were analyzed in the aggregate and then studied based
on the violation of specific statute groups in an attempt to determine if one type of crime
is more likely to yield a disparity in sentence based on a plea bargain or trial conviction.
Severity was classified as possession vs. distribution and the quantity of narcotics
involved. For example, statutes 1 through 4 represent the sale of heroin in various
quantities. Statutes 16 through 19 represent the possession of cocaine in various
quantities. The following table lists statues by citation and description.
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Table 2
Statutes and Their Descriptions_____________________
Sales Crimes
1. 720 ILCS 570/401 (a) (1) (A)

Heroin, 15-99g

2. 720 ILCS 570/401 (a) (1) (B)

Heroin, 100-399g

3. 720 ILCS 570/401 (a) (1) (C)

Heroin, 400-899g

4. 720 ILCS 570/401 (a) (1) (D)

Heroin, 900+g

5. 720 ILCS 570/401 (a) (2) (A)

Cocaine, 15-99g

6. 720 ILCS 570/401 (a) (2) (B)

Cocaine, 100-399g

7. 720 ILCS 570/401 (a) (2) (C)

Cocaine, 400-899g

8. 720 ILCS 570/401 (a) (2) (D)

Cocaine, 900+g

9. 720 ILCS 570/401 (c) (1) Heroin, 1-14 g
10. 720 ILCS 570/401 (c) (2) Cocaine, 1-14 g
11. 720 ILCS 570/401 (d)

Heroin and Cocaine, < 1g

_____________________________________________
Possession Crimes
12. 720 ILCS 570/402 (a) (1) (A)

Heroin, 15-99g

13. 720 ILCS 570/402 (a) (1) (B)

Heroin, 100-399g

14. 720 ILCS 570/402 (a) (1) (C)

Heroin, 400-899g

15. 720 ILCS 570/402 (a) (1) (D)

Heroin, 900+g

16. 720 ILCS 570/402 (a) (2) (A)

Cocaine, 15-99g

17. 720 ILCS 570/402 (a) (2) (B)

Cocaine, 100-399g

18. 720 ILCS 570/402 (a) (2) (C)

Cocaine, 400-899g

19. 720 ILCS 570/402 (a) (2) (D)

Cocaine, 900+g

20. 720 ILCS 570/402 (c)

Heroin and Cocaine, < 15g

______________________________________________
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The results of Johnson (2003), King (2005) and Ulmer and Bradley (2006)
suggest that ethnicity plays a role in how the criminal justice system treats a defendant.
In addition, according to The Sentencing Project, Blacks make up approximately 46% of
the U.S. prison population while they account for only 13% of the U.S. population.
Between 1994 and 2002, the mean sentence for Blacks convicted of drug crimes
increased 73% compared to a 28% increase for White drug offenders. Blacks serve
almost as much time in prison for drug offenses, on average 57.2 months, as Whites do
for violent offenses, about 58.8 months.
Analyses Performed
The central research question associated with this study asks whether a
statistically significant difference exists between the sentences of those convicted of a
crime by plea bargain versus jury trial while controlling for background and context
variables.
Chi-square tests were performed to compare differences between groups such as
ethnicity and gender in an attempt to determine whether or not these variables may be
used to predict sentence across those groups. Chi-square tests were run to check for
sentence differences for those who plea bargained or lost at trial, based on gender and
then ethnicity. As with all analyses performed in this study, the two main groups were
plea bargain and convicted at trial.
The chi-square test determines whether an association exists between two or more
categorical variables. With two categorical variables this results in a two-dimensional
contingency table illustrating frequency and proportions; three categorical variables
results in a 2 x 3 table as illustrated below.
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For example, a chi-square test of association may be run comparing the number of
African Americans, Hispanics and Whites who plea bargained or were convicted at trial.
Such a contingency table may appear as follows, with a through f representing frequency
counts.
Table 3
Example of a Contingency Table

_________

Conviction Mode
Ethnicity

Plea Bargain

Trial Conviction

Row Total:

Black

a

b

a+b

Hispanic

c

d

c+d

White

e

f

e+f

Column Total:
a+c+e
b+d+f
_____________________________________________________________________
From this a test-statistic is calculated and compared to a critical value from a chisquare table. If the test-statistic is larger than the critical value, it lends credence to the
assumption that the categorical variables have some association. If the test statistic
exceeds the critical value, then ethnicity is associated with the sentence received. If the
test-statistic is smaller than the critical value, ethnicity is not associated with sentence.
Two-sample t-tests were performed to assess whether the mean from a variable
differed from a determined constant. A two-sample t-test compares the mean difference
between each value of the variable and a test value which assumes no variation. This
analysis was used to test for significant differences between means.
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This study also utilized the two-way ANOVA procedure to test whether the
means of certain groups are equal considering the possible interaction of independent
variables.
Parameter estimates from a general linear model, an analysis of the relationship
between independent variables and a continuous dependent variable, modeled by a least
squares function, was used in an attempt to predict sentence. Models indicate which
independent variables, if any, are predictors of the dependent variable. A common
example is socioeconomic status and academic achievement. A positive, linear
relationship is usually found when comparing socioeconomic status and academic
achievement. In this study, independent variables such as plea bargaining vs. trial, the
offense severity, ethnicity, gender and interaction effects were studied for their predictive
power on sentencing.
By creating different models, this study attempted to discover a coefficient
estimate for conviction type – plea bargain vs. trial, while considering contact variables.
That is, can sentence length be predicted by adjudication method while controlling for
independent variables such as ethnicity, gender, offense seriousness, quantity and
interaction effects?
Coding
Coding was created for the independent variables of gender, ethnicity, conviction
type and the different types of offense severity – sales vs. possession and then quantity.
Those variables may then be incorporated into a variety of models to search for
statistically significant results relating to the application of said variables as a function of
the adjudication method to predict sentence length.
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Interaction occurs when a mixed effect may be present. An interaction is
associated with the effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable based on
the values of another predictor. For example, there may be a difference in sentence based
on ethnicity but that may come about from the conviction mode. As such, the correlation
between variables may depend on the value from other variables.
Comparison of variable interaction may be obtained by assigning specific dummy
values for data from each variable. Hays (1994) and Pedhazur (1997) discuss a code
scenario for defining independent variables as dummy or group variables. Categorical
variables are effect coded, that is, each category’s mean is compared to a grand mean
where each category’s intercept is compared to the reference group’s intercept.
Schemes for Codes
The following table illustrates the codes used in this study for the independent
variables. The dependent variable, sentence, was coded as a continuous variable.
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Table 4
Summary of Independent Variable Coding Schemes
Conviction Mode Code
Plea Bargain
0
Trial Conviction
1
__________________________________________
Probation or Prison Code
Probation
0
Prison
1
__________________________________________
Seriousness Code
Possession
0
Sales
1
__________________________________________
Quantity
Code
< 15 g
0
≥ 15 g
1
__________________________________________
Gender
Code
Male
0
Female
1
__________________________________________
Ethnicity Ethnic Group Not of that Group
Black
1
0
Hispanic
1
0
__________________________________________
Dummy codes were used for these categorical variables. Seven of the almost
thirteen-thousand offenders were noted as being other than Black, Hispanic or White and
were ignored in this study as they make up only 0.05% of the sample. The following
table displays the ethnicity coding.
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For gender, male was coded as 0 while female was coded as 1. This again allows
for a comparison; men will make up approximately 87% of the convictions. Johnson
(2003) found that sentence received correlates to gender.
For conviction type, plea bargain was coded 0 while convicted at trial was 1. This
set-up will create a coefficient estimate of the trial tax, net of everything else in the
model. Probation will be coded 0 while having received prison time will be coded 1.
Selling of narcotics was coded 1 while possession was coded 0 for the analysis.
Therefore, the coefficient result will tell the “extra” sentence, if any, for the more serious
offense of selling. Quantity was considered by coding less than 15 grams as 0 while
equal to or greater than 15 grams as 1. This may reveal an “extra” sentence impact for
the greater quantity of drugs involved.
For the two-sample t-tests and ANOVAs used in this study making Group A = 0
and Group B = 1 or the other way around does not impact the output from any analysis as
this is dummy coding.
However, this study utilized parameter estimates from a general linear model
analysis to estimate sentence. In such analyses the largest categorical value serves as the
reference point for comparison purposes. For example, coding the variable named
conviction mode with plea bargain = 0 and trial conviction = 1 allows for the comparison
of any “extra” sentence received associated with a trial conviction.
Interaction effects occur when the interfacing of two or more independent
variables creates its own effect beyond the main effect of the independent variables
themselves. In this study the interaction effect coding occurred within the software
utilized for running single dependent variable general linear models.
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The combination of chi-square analyses, two-sample t-tests, two-way ANOVAs
and general linear models yielded answers to this study’s focus on the possible existence
of a trial tax and what independent variables may be used to predict sentence.

CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
This study utilized two-way ANOVA, chi-square tests, two-sample t-tests and
general linear models in an attempt to answer the following questions. Does the trial tax
exist in Cook County, Illinois? In other words, are defendants convicted at trial more
likely to receive heftier sentences than those who plea bargain? Assuming a disparity,
does it remain when controlling for other variables such as gender, ethnicity, offense
seriousness, quantity and interaction effects?
Before proceeding, a review of the dataset’s characteristics was performed. First,
an analysis of the statutes was effected to determine if any, or a group, dominate the
dataset. The influence of prevailing statutes may skew the results of this study. An
investigation of offense severity was performed to search for its effect on results. The
more serious a crime should, in theory, lead to a higher sentence, thus also possibly
distorting the results. To further guide the analyses used in this study an examination of
the subjects was conducted. With all, the main group remained those who plea bargained
vs. those convicted at trial, while considering other independent variables.
Dominant Statutes
The analysis began by creating a frequency distribution of statutes violated. This
was done to determine if a statute or group of statutes might skew the results by their
domination of the dataset. It yielded the following results.
36

37
Table 5
Frequency Distribution of Statutes Violated_
Statute

Frequency

Percent

Sales:
1. Heroin 15-99g

104

0.8%

2. Heroin 100-399g

5

0.0%

3. Heroin 400-899g

3

0.0%

4. Heroin 900+g

3

0.0%

376

2.9%

6. Cocaine 100-399g

62

0.5%

7. Cocaine 400-899g

17

0.1%

8. Cocaine 900+g

40

0.3%

9. Heroin 1-14g

1,389

10.9%

10. Cocaine 1-14g

1,964

15.4%

11. Heroin or
Cocaine <1g

3,163

24.7%

12. Heroin 15-99g

2

0.0%

16. Cocaine 15-99g

79

0.6%

17. Cocaine 100-399g

14

0.1%

1

0.0%

5. Cocaine 15-99g

Possession:

19. Cocaine 900+g

20. Heroin or
Cocaine < 15g
5,564
43.5%
____________________________________
Four statutes, 13 – 15 and 18 were not represented. Of the 12,786 cases, 94.5%
related to just four of the remaining statutes. Statute 20, possession of less than 15g of
cocaine or heroin accounted for 43.5% of all violations in this study. Statutes 9, 10 and
11, distribution of 1 – 14g of heroin, distribution of 1 – 14g of cocaine and distribution of
less than 1g of cocaine or heroin, respectively, made up 51% of all cases studied.
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Statute 20 represents possession crimes with 43.5% of all cases while Statutes 9,
10 and 11 characterize the impact of sales crimes making up 51% of all violations.
Almost 95% of the convictions in this study relate to quantities less than 15g. However,
traditional wisdom suggests that larger quantities result in longer sentences. As such, the
impact of crimes dealing with quantities of 15g or more was studied separately. This was
done both in comparison to crimes dealing with less than 15g and for the interaction
effect between quantity and possess vs. sell to study seriousness.
Probation vs. Prison
Considering all statutes, just over 5% of the subjects in this dataset received a
sentence of probation as indicated by a sentence length of zero. As noted previously,
some consider plea bargaining an indicator of the willingness to accept responsibility and
perhaps a propensity to reform. In addition, those who plead guilty may receive a
bargain on their sentence. Over 93% of the subjects plea bargained. The following
tables illustrate both distributions.
Table 6
Comparison of Probation vs. Prison__
N
Probation
Prison

Percentage

682

5.3%

12,104

94.7%

Total
12,786
100%
______________________________
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Table 7
Comparison of Plea Bargain vs. Trial Conviction
N

Percentage

Plea Bargain 11,903
Trial
Conviction

_

93.1%

883

6.9%

Total
12,786
100%
_________________________________________________________________
Conviction Mode
The following table shows that, of those who received a prison sentence, almost
95% received the sentence through plea bargaining. Thus, the majority of subjects in this
study plea bargained and received a prison sentence.
Table 8
Prison Time by Conviction Mode

__

Prison____
Plea Bargain
Trial Conviction

11,437 (94.5%)
667 (5.6%)

Total
12,104 (100%)
_______________________________
The following table presents the comparison of conviction mode to whether the
subject received prison or probation. For the entire data set, over 96% of those who plea
bargained received a prison sentence. Plea bargainers and those who receive a prison
term dominate the data set.
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Table 9
Conviction Mode Compared to Probation or Prison_
Plea Bargain
Probation
Prison

Trial Conviction

466 (3.9%)

All_

216 (24.5%)

11,437 (96.1%) 667 (75.5%)

_
_

682 (5.3%)
12,104 (94.7%)

Total
11,903 (100%) 883 (100%)
12,786 (100%)
_____________________________________________________
An analysis of this data found a significant association between conviction mode
2

and probation vs. prison (χ = 683.22, p < 0.0001).
Subjects not receiving a prison sentence will no longer be considered in the
analyses for this study. The data set is dominated by those who received a prison
sentence – almost 95% of all subjects. In addition, the study’s intent is to test for the
presence of a trial tax and if it is found, attempt to measure it. Those receiving a sentence
of zero months did not receive a trial tax, regardless of their conviction mode. By
definition of this study’s intent they should be excluded.
The following table shows the comparison of sentence means, for those receiving
prison time, based on conviction mode.
Table 10
Comparison of Sentence and Conviction Mode for Mean Sentence (in Months)
Conviction Mode
Plea Bargain
Trial Conviction

N

M

SD _

11,437 25.87 17.05
667 42.59 37.64

Total
12,104 26.79 19.16
______________________________________________________________
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Those convicted at trial received a statistically significant, greater sentence than
those who plea bargained – almost 17 months or 65% more prison time (t = 153.882, p <
0.0001). A check of the distribution of means was performed. For plea bargainers, their
sentences ranged from 0.03 months to 204.00 months. For those convicted at trial the
sentences ranged from 0.20 months to 420.00 months. In answer to this study’s primary
research question, this evidence suggests a trial tax does exist. The study will now focus
on contextual variables.
Offense Seriousness
As noted earlier in this study, offense seriousness is classified according to
whether the crime relates to possession or selling narcotics and the quantity involved, less
than 15g or equal to or greater than 15 g. The more serious a crime, traditional wisdom
suggests, the more lengthy the sentence. A frequency distribution for this dataset
revealed the following.
Table 11
Convictions for Quantity Compared to Offense Seriousness
Seriousness

< 15g

≥ 15g____

Possession

5,395 (47.0%)

79 (12.6%)

Sales

6,082 (53.0%)

548 (87.4%)

Total
11,477 (100%)
627 (100%)
_______________________________________________
A simple visual inspection reveals that, for equal to or greater than 15g crimes,
over 86% related to narcotics distribution, not simple possession. This strongly suggests
that quantity associates with whether the crime related to possession or sales. A chi2

square analysis affirms the supposition (χ = 282.74, p < 0.0001) that quantity relates to
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possession or sales. The subsequent table illustrates the mean sentence in months for
quantity by offense seriousness. Convictions involving < 15g dominate the dataset
making up almost 95% of all cases while possession compared to sales crimes is about
equally split. A check of the distribution of means was performed. For those convicted
of crimes relating to < 15g, the sentences for possessors ranged from 0.03 to 168.00
months; for those who sold, 0.07 months to 240.00 months. For those convicted of ≥ 15g
crimes, the sentences for possessors ranged from 0.10 to 144.00 months; for those who
sold, 0.07 months to 420.00 months.
Table 12
Mean Sentence (in Months) for Seriousness Factors______________
< 15g
N

M

Possession

5,395

18.46

Sales

6,082

≥ 15g_________
SD__

N

M

SD__

8.72

79

41.26

25.72

31.67 18.98

548

52.64

40.30

Total
11,477 25.46 16.44
627
51.20 38.94
_______________________________________________________
Next, a two-way ANOVA was run to test for interaction between quantity and
offense seriousness for mean sentences. As noted in the next table, no interaction was
detected (F = 0.775, p = 0.379, Levene’s test of equality p < 0.0001, Observed Power =
0.142).
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Table 13
Analysis of Variance for Sentence Length______________
2

p__

Variable

df

F

η

Possess vs. sell

1

139.356

0.011

0.000

Quantity

1

441.163

0.035

0.000

Interaction

1

0.775

0.000

0.379

Subjects
within-group error
12,103 (0.203)
_______________________________________________

Selling, as opposed to possession, leads to a higher prison sentence regardless of
quantity. The quantity ≥ 15g results in a greater sentence than < 15g regardless of
whether the defendant sold or simply possessed the narcotic. As such, quantity and
possession vs. sales should be used in the general linear model as independent variables.
In terms of mean sentence, there is no interaction between possession vs. sales and
quantity. Based on the statistical results, this study will not utilize an interaction effect
for seriousness and quantity.
Gender
The next table illustrates the frequency distribution of gender in the aggregate and
by conviction mode.
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Table 14
Comparison of Gender and Conviction Mode_______
Gender

Plea Bargain

Male
Female

___

Trial Conviction

All_

_

9,892 (86.5%)

590 (88.5%)

10,482 (86.6%)

1,542 (13.5%)

77 (11.5%)

1,622 (13.4%)

Total
11,437 (100%)
667 (100%)
12,104 (100%)
_______________________________________________________
As noted earlier, over 93% of the subjects chose to plea bargain and almost 87%
of those were male. 86.5% of those who plea bargained were male and 88.5% of those
convicted at trial were male. Females made up 13.5% of all plea bargainers and 11.5% of
all those convicted at trial. A review of the breakdown by gender shows neither males
2

nor females were more likely to plea bargain or have lost at trial (χ = 1.89, p = 0.169). It
seems gender is not associated with whether a subject plea bargains or loses at trial even
though males dominate the dataset. However, the possible interaction may be veiled as
the dataset is so dominated by males.
As noted previously, a review of sentence means from this dataset revealed that
those who plea bargain receive a significantly lighter sentence than those convicted at
trial. If there is no difference between males and females plea bargaining, as indicated
above, it seems logical that their sentences would be similar unless an interaction effect
exists.
Gender and Conviction Mode Compared to Sentence
The subsequent table shows the mean sentence by gender in the aggregate and
then by conviction mode. A check of the distribution of means was performed. For plea
bargainers the males’ sentences ranged from 0.03 months to 204.00 months. Female plea
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bargainer sentences ranged from 0.03 months to 96 months. For those convicted at trial,
male sentences ranged from 0.20 months to 420.00 months while female sentences from
0.67 months to 96 months.
Table 15
Comparison of Gender and Conviction Mode for Mean Sentence (in Months)_______ __
Male
Conviction Mode
Plea Bargain
Trial Conviction

N

M

Female
SD_

N

M

9,892 26.49 17.65

1,545 21.92

590 44.36 38.93

77 29.05

All
SD

N

M

__
SD_

11.84 11,437 25.87

17.05

20.26

37.64

667 42.59

Total
10,482 27.50 20.35
1,622 22.26 12.45 12,104 26.79 19.16
________________________________________________________________________
It appears that males tended to receive heftier prison sentences regardless of
conviction mode. A two-way ANOVA was run to check for interaction between gender
and conviction type considering sentence. A significant interaction was found (F =
21.398, p < 0.0001, Levene’s Test of Equality p < 0.0001, Observed Power = 0.996) as
illustrated in the next table.
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Table 16
Analysis of Variance for Gender and Conviction Mode Regarding Sentence
2

Variable
Gender

df
1

F
73.384

η
0.006

p_
0.000

Conviction Mode

1

115.995

0.009

0.000

Interaction

1

21.398

0.002

0.000

_

Subjects
within-group error
12,103 (0.049)
____________________________________________________________
In partial answer to the research question related to controlling variables, the
interaction between gender and conviction mode matters in terms of sentence. Males
receive a heftier sentence than their female counterparts.
Figure 1 illustrates the gender disparity. The x-axis shows sentence in months.
The y-axis indicates the categorical variable plea bargain vs. trial conviction. Regardless
of conviction mode, males received the higher sentence. However, males appear to have
received a much heftier sentence than females when convicted at trial. Females receive
the least hefty sentence, period. However, being female and plea bargaining produces the
lowest sentence.
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Estimated Marginal Means of Sentence in Months
Gender

45.00

Estimated Sentence Marginal Means

Male
Female
40.00

35.00

30.00

25.00

20.00
Plea Bargain

Trial Conviction

Plea Bargain v Trial Conviction
Figure 1. Comparison of sentence means considering conviction mode and gender.
___________________________________________________________________
The next controlling variable to be explored is ethnicity.
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Ethnicity
The below tables illustrate ethnic distribution by conviction mode and in the
aggregate.
Table 17
Comparison of Ethnicity and Conviction Mode___
Conviction Mode

Black

Plea Bargain

Hispanic

_____
White

All_

_

9,360 (94.2%) 900 (95.4%) 1,177 (96.2%) 11,437 (94.5%)

Trial Conviction

577 (5.8%)

43 (4.6%)

47 (3.8%)

667 (5.5%)

Total
9,937 (100%) 943 (100%) 1,224 (100%) 12,104 (100%)
______________________________________________________________________
Ethnicity is significantly associated with choosing to plea bargain vs. receiving a
2

trial conviction (χ = 9.87, p = 0.0072). It appears that Whites are more likely to plea
bargain compared to Blacks who are more likely to have not taken the plea bargain and
then lost at trial. As noted earlier, those who plea bargain receive a statistically
significant lower sentence than those convicted at trial. If Blacks receive a higher mean
sentence, their propensity to go to trial and lose (not to plea bargain), may explain that
group’s higher mean sentence.
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Ethnicity and Conviction Mode compared to Sentence
Table 18
Comparison of Ethnicity and Conviction Mode for Mean Sentence (in Months)_____
Plea Bargain

Trial Conviction

Total

___

M

SD__

Ethnicity

Black
Hispanic
White

N

M

SD__

9,360

26.20

16.28

577 43.10 34.42

9,937 27.18 18.23

900 26.17

22.47

43 36.17 36.74

943 26.63 23.38

1,177 23.05

17.95

47 42.14 60.05

1,224 23.78 22.10

N

M

SD___

N

All
11,437 25.87 17.05
667 42.59 37.64
12,104 26.79 19.16
____________________________________________________________________
The above table illustrates the mean sentence received based on conviction mode
and ethnicity. A check of the distribution of means was performed. For plea bargainers,
Blacks’ sentences ranged from 0.03 months to 192 months, Hispanics’ from 0.07 months
to 204.00 months and for Whites the mean sentence ranged from 0.03 to 180.00 months.
For those convicted at trial, Blacks’ sentences ranged from 0.20 months to 240.00
months, Hispanics’ from 0.67 to 180.00 months and for Whites, from 0.20 months to
420.00 months.
A two-way ANOVA was run to check for interaction between ethnicity and
conviction mode regarding sentence length. None was found (F = 2.024, p = 0.132,
Levene’s Test of Equality p < 0.0001, Observed Power = 0.586) as illustrated below.
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Table 19
Analysis of Variance for Ethnicity and Conviction Mode Regarding Sentence
F

2

p_ _______________

Variable

df

Ethnicity

2

3.405

0.001

0.082

Conviction Mode

1

124.435

0.010

0.000

Interaction

2

3.016

0.000

0.089

η

Subjects
within-group error
12,103 (0.042)
_____________________________________________________________
No effect was found for ethnicity or the interaction of ethnicity and the conviction
mode. However, there was a main effect for conviction. As such, controlling for
ethnicity, there is still a trial tax effect, that is, an association between sentence length and
conviction mode. Regardless of ethnicity, sentence length is greater for those convicted
at trial compared to those who plea bargained.
The next analysis performed tested for an association between ethnicity and the
seriousness categories.
Ethnicity and Offense Seriousness
Frequency distribution tables of ethnicity and possession vs. sales and then
ethnicity and quantity appear next.
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Table 20
Comparison of Ethnicity and Offense Seriousness____
Hispanic

__

Seriousness

Black

White

All_

_

Possession

3,908 (39.3%)

578 (61.3%) 988 (80.7%) 5,474 (45.2%)

Sales

6,029 (60.7%)

365 (38.7%) 236 (19.3%) 6,630 (54.8%)

Total
9,937 (100%) 943 (100%) 1,224 (100%) 12,104 (100%)
____________________________________________________________________
Table 21
Comparison of Ethnicity and Quantity
Quantity

Black

< 15g

9,532 (95.9%)

≥ 15g

405 (4.1%)

____

__

Hispanic

White

All_

_

815 (86.4%) 1,130 (92.3%) 11,477 (94.8%)
128 (13.2%)

94 (7.7%)

627 (5.2%)

Total
9,937 (100%) 943 (100%) 1,224 (100%) 12,104 (100%)
______________________________________________________________________
A chi-square analysis found a significant association between ethnicity and
2

possession vs. sales (χ = 756.54, p < 0.0001). Another chi-square analysis found a
2

significant association between ethnicity and quantity (χ = 32.3, p < 0.0001). It seems
Blacks are convicted more often of sales crimes but Whites are more often convicted of
the larger quantities. Whites seem to receive possession convictions for larger quantities
while Blacks receive sales convictions for the smaller quantities.
The subsequent table presents a comparison of sentence means based on ethnicity
and possession vs. sales. A check of the distribution of means was performed. For
possession crimes, Blacks’ sentences ranged from 0.03 months to 168.00 months,
Hispanics’ from 0.07 months to 84.00 months and for Whites the mean sentence ranged
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from 0.03 to 72.00 months. For sales crimes, Blacks’ sentences ranged from 0.07 months
to 240.00 months, Hispanics’ from 0.07 to 204.00 months and for Whites, from 0.27
months to 420.00 months.
Table 22
Comparison of Ethnicity and Possession vs. Sales for Mean Sentence (in Months)____
Possession

Sales

Total___________

Ethnicity
N
Black

M

SD__

N

M

SD__

N

M

SD__ _

3,908 18.66

9.79

6,029 32.71 20.27

9,937 27.18 18.23

Hispanic

578 18.88

9.30

365 38.91 32.10

943 26.63 23.38

White

988 19.25 8.87

236 42.76 42.00

1,224 23.78 22.10

All
5,474 18.79 9.58
6,630 33.41 22.31 12,104 26.79 19.16
____________________________________________________________________
The next offense seriousness analysis relates to quantity. The below table
presents a comparison of sentence means based on ethnicity and quantity. A check of the
distribution of means was performed. For < 15g crimes, Blacks’ sentences ranged from
0.03 months to 240.00 months, Hispanics’ from 0.07 months to 72.00 months and for
Whites the mean sentence ranged from 0.03 to 108.00 months. For ≥ 15g crimes, Blacks’
sentences ranged from 0.07 months to 192.00 months, Hispanics’ from 0.07 to 204.00
months and for Whites, from 0.10 months to 420.00 months.
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Table 23
Comparison of Ethnicity and Quantity for Mean Sentence (in Months)_
< 15g

≥ 15g

__
Total __

Ethnicity
N
Black
Hispanic
Whites

M

SD__

N

M

SD___

N

M

SD_

9,532 26.34 17.06

405

46.92 30.61

9,937 27.18 18.23

815 21.40 11.71

128

59.92 43.38

943 26.63 23.38

1,130 20.95 12.25

94

57.77 57.78

1,224 23.78 22.10

All
11,477 25.46 16.44
627 51.20 38.94
12,104 26.79 19.16
_____________________________________________________________________
The mean and standard deviation for Whites convicted of crimes relating to ≥ 15g
both being so close to 57.8 is pure coincidence. Again, for that group the ninety-four
subjects had sentences varying from 0.10 months to 420 months.
To examine the effects of ethnicity, quantity and seriousness a three-way factorial
ANOVA was conducted. Its output appears in the table below.
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Table 24
Analysis of Variance for Ethnicity and Quantity and Seriousness Regarding Sentence
2

Variable

df

F

η

p_

Ethnicity

2

3.618

0.001

0.027

Quantity

1

359.942

0.029

0.000

Seriousness

1

126.420

0.010

0.000

Ethnicity * Quantity

2

4.162

0.001

0.016

Ethnicity * Seriousness 2

14.992

0.002

0.000

Quantity * Seriousness 1

2.802

0.000

0.094

Three-way Interaction:
Ethnicity * Quantity *
Seriousness
2

13.964

0.002

0.078

_

Subjects
within-group error
12,103 (0.210)
__________________________________________________________________
No three-way interaction was detected (F = 13.964, p = 0.078, Levene’s Test of
Equality p < 0.0001, Observed Power = 0.387). However, there was a main effect for
ethnicity, quantity and seriousness. The interaction between ethnicity and quantity and
ethnicity and seriousness was again noted. There was no significant interaction between
quantity and seriousness.
An interaction between ethnicity and possession vs. sales as it relates to sentence
was found (F = 14.992, p < 0.0001). As an interaction was found, there was no need to
interpret the main effect. Differences in sentence based on ethnicity appear to depend on
the statutory seriousness of the crime – possession or sales. Whites receive the heftiest
sentences while Blacks receive the least severe sentences for sales crimes.
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Estimated Marginal Means of Sentence in Months
Ethnicity

45.00

Estimated Sentence Marginal Means

Black
Hispanic
White

40.00

35.00

30.00

25.00

20.00

15.00

Possess

Sell
Possess or Sell

Figure 2. Comparison of sentence means considering ethnicity and possess vs. sell.
____________________________________________________________________

Figure 2 illustrates the interaction of ethnicity compared to possession vs. sales in
terms of sentence. The x-axis represents sentence in months. The y-axis represents the
categorical variable possess vs. sell. Sentences appear not that different, in terms of
ethnicity, for possession crimes. For sales crimes, however, Whites tend to receive the
highest mean sentence and Blacks the lowest.
An interaction between ethnicity and quantity as it relates to sentence was found
(F = 4.162, p = 0.016). As an interaction was found, there was no need to interpret the
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main effect. Differences in sentence based on ethnicity appear to depend on the quantity
involved.

Estimated Marginal Means of Sentence in Months
Ethnicity

Estimated Sentence Marginal Means

60.00

Black
Hispanic
White

50.00

40.00

30.00

20.00
≥ 15g

< 15g

Quantity
Figure 3. Comparison of sentence means considering ethnicity and quantity.
____________________________________________________________________

Figure 3 illustrates the interaction of ethnicity compared to quantity in terms of
sentence. The x-axis shows sentence in months. The y-axis represents the categorical
variable < 15g or ≥ 15g. For the smaller quantity of < 15g the sentences do not appear
that far apart. For the larger quantities, ≥ 15g, a greater disparity is indicated.
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Sentence means by ethnicity do not vary much for lower quantities, which make
up, as noted earlier in Table 8, almost 95% of all convictions in this dataset. Overall, it
seems Blacks tend to have longer sentences for sales crimes for quantities < 15g while
Whites have longer sentences for possessing quantities ≥ 15g. However, most
convictions in this data set, 95%, were for < 15g and Blacks dominate the dataset, 82%.
In addition to using ethnicity as an independent variable in the general linear
model, interaction variables for ethnicity and possession vs. sales and ethnicity and
quantity will also be utilized.
Summary
Overall, trial convictions are significantly associated with a higher sentence than
plea bargain convictions. Almost 95% of the subjects of this dataset plea bargained
which may skew analyses results toward the plea bargain characteristic of lesser
sentence. As such, interaction effects between the controlling variables and conviction
mode, compared to sentence, were analyzed. Males made up 87% of all subjects and
minorities accounted for 90% of all subjects. The dataset’s domination by certain groups
based on gender and ethnicity led to the analysis of interaction effects between those
independent variables and conviction mode compared to sentence.
Crime seriousness, based on possession or sales and then quantity, showed no
interaction effect. Crimes involving < 15g made up 95% of all cases but were relatively
evenly split between possession or sales convictions. Statutes for ≥ 15g, 5% of all cases,
showed 86% of those convictions were for sales crimes. Possession vs. sales associated
with quantity.
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Sales crimes netted the greater sentence when compared to simple possession. ≥
15g crimes made up only 5% of the dataset but produced a greater mean sentence than
crimes of < 15g. Overall, the dataset is dominated by convictions for the smaller
quantities. Offense seriousness, possession vs. sales and quantity, ties directly to the
results for ethnicity as explained below. Regardless of any other independent variable,
increased seriousness resulted in increased sentence. As such, the independent variables
of possession vs. sales and then quantity will be used in the upcoming general linear
models.
Males dominate the data set. Gender was not associated with conviction mode.
That is, being male or female didn’t matter in terms of predicting conviction mode.
However, gender did associate to sentence. The interaction of gender and conviction
mode was also significantly associated with sentence. Males tended to receive a higher
sentence regardless of conviction mode. However, for those convicted at trial, they
received a much higher sentence than their female counterparts. As such, gender itself
and the interaction effect between it and conviction mode will be utilized as predictor
variables in the upcoming general linear model section.
Minorities dominate the dataset as Blacks make up 82% and Hispanics 8% of all
subjects. Ethnicity showed a significant association in terms of whether the subject plea
bargained or lost at trial and in terms of sentence. Blacks seem less likely to plea
bargain, which at first may seem to explain their higher overall mean sentence as trial
convictions result in more hefty sentences. However, no evidence was found for an
interaction between ethnicity and conviction mode. Regardless of ethnicity, a trial
conviction resulted in a greater sentence than a plea bargain.
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In terms of offense seriousness, Blacks associated more with sales crimes while
Whites associated more with ≥ 15g convictions. It should be remembered, however, that
the greater quantity accounted for only 5% of all cases. Evidence was found for an
interaction between ethnicity and possession vs. sales and then for quantity. Blacks,
compared to Whites, were more often convicted of and received higher sentences for
sales crimes involving < 15g. Whites, compared to Blacks, were more often convicted of
and received heftier sentences for possession crimes of ≥ 15g. Differences in sentence
based on ethnicity depend on the seriousness of the crime, that is, whether it was for
possession or sales and the quantity. Based on these results, ethnicity and the referenced
interactions will serve as independent variables in the general linear models.
In an attempt to measure the noted associations, parameter estimates from general
linear models were computed.
General Linear Models
Does plea bargaining vs. a trial conviction predict sentence duration when controlling for
predictor variables?
General linear models, an analysis of the linear relationship between independent
variables and a continuous dependent variable, modeled by a least squares function, was
used in an attempt to predict sentence. Models indicate which independent variables, if
any, are predictors of the dependent variable and to what degree. As always in this study,
the single dependent variable remains sentence, measured in months. The following table
notes the independent variables used.
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Table 25
Independent Variables______________________
1. Conviction Mode – Jury Trial or Plea Bargain
2. Seriousness – Possession or Sales
3. Quantity (<15g or ≥15g)
4. Gender
5. Gender * Conviction Mode
6. Black
7. Hispanic
8. Black * Seriousness
9. Hispanic * Seriousness
10. Black * Quantity
11. Hispanic * Quantity
______________________________________
Based on t-test, chi-square and two-way ANOVA analyses, each of the above
independent variables showed an association with sentence.
Analyses suggested a significant association between conviction mode and
sentence – trial convictions, resulted in more hefty sentences. However, an interaction
effect was found between conviction mode and whether the defendant received probation
or prison.
Previous analyses in this study showed a significant association between sentence
and whether the related crime was for possession or sales of narcotics and the quantity
involved. Sales and greater quantity crimes correlated with increased sentences.
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Other analyses indicated that females tend to get a lighter sentence than males and
that an interaction effect between gender and conviction mode exists. Males received
heavier sentences regardless of conviction mode, but especially heavy sentences for trial
convictions when compared to females.
Still other analyses indicated that Whites received lighter sentences than
minorities, overall and for plea bargaining cases but not for trial convictions. Minorities
tended to be convicted more often of sales crimes involving < 15g and Whites received
the higher sentences for possessing ≥ 15g – a significant interaction effect occurred for
ethnicity and offense severity in terms of being Black and possession vs. sales crimes,
Black and quantity and Hispanic and quantity.
The next table summarizes the coding scheme used for the independent variables.
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Table 26
Summary of Independent Variable Coding Schemes
Conviction Mode Code
Plea Bargain
0
Trial Conviction
1
__________________________________________
Seriousness Code
Possession
0
Sales
1
__________________________________________
Quantity
Code
< 15 g
0
≥ 15 g
1
__________________________________________
Gender
Code
Male
0
Female
1
__________________________________________
Ethnicity Ethnic Group Not of that Group
Black
1
0
Hispanic
1
0
__________________________________________
The use of coding allows for the creation of multiple linear models based on a
subject’s characteristics. For example, one convict may be a White male convicted at
trial for possessing < 15g. Another subject may be a Black male who plea bargained his
conviction for selling ≥ 15g. A foundational linear model appears below; it accounts for
all independent variables. See Appendix A for a complete listing of models.
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β4)(Female) +
(β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) + (β6)(Black) + (β7)(Hispanic) + (β8)(Black * Sell) +
(β9)(Hispanic * Sell) + (β10)(Black * ≥ 15g) + (β11)(Hispanic * ≥ 15g) + e
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The subsequent table displays the output using all predictor variables. Defendants
who received probation were not included. The central theme of this study relates to
testing for and measuring the trial tax, that is, the additional sentence received for a trial
conviction compared to a plea bargain. Those who received probation did so whether
they plea bargained or lost at trial; as such, they were excluded from in the analysis.
Table 27
Summary of Linear Model Analysis to Predict Sentence Using All Independent Variables
Variable

b

SE(b)

18.846

0.543

0.000

Trial Conviction

3.306

0.593

0.000

Sell

7.419

1.846

0.000

≥ 15 g

20.467

2.771

0.000

Female

-14.469

2.025

0.000

Female X Trial Conviction

11.445

2.076

0.000

Black

-13.807

1.945

0.000

Hispanic

-1.535

2.298

0.504

Black X Sell

2.612

1.363

0.055

Hispanic X Sell

5.184

1.814

0.404

Black X ≥ 15 g

10.830

2.131

0.000

Hispanic X ≥ 15 g

-4.253

2.636

0.107

Constant

p. _______________

_

R Square 0.239
_______________________________________________________________________
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Interpreting the output from the previous table must be done in comparison to
“the other” from the variable noted. For example, the variable Trial Conviction is the
comparison of being convicted at trial to plea bargaining. The variable Sell refers to
selling a narcotic as opposed to simply possessing it. The variable Female refers to the
coefficient for females when compared to males.
The output begins with a constant of regression equal to 18.846 months. Every
subject begins with that as a sentence and then the contextual variables may add or
subtract time, via the model, to that time. Being convicted at trial adds 3.306 months to
the sentence. Continuing, if it was a sales crime another 7.419 months is added to the
sentence. Selling the larger quantity of narcotics, ≥ 15g, will increase sentence by 20.467
months. As predicted, a trial conviction and greater seriousness is associated with a
heftier sentence.
Being female reduces sentence by 14.469 months. As predicted, being female
was associated with a reduced sentence but a female convicted at trial received less of a
reduced sentence than one who plea bargained. Females who lose at trial, however,
receive an additional 11.445 months on top of the constant.
This initial coefficient of Blacks receiving a sentence reduction of 13.807 months
2

may be explained by the domination of minorities in this dataset – almost 90% (χ =
9.13, p = 0.0025). Blacks made up 82.2% and Hispanics 7.7%. As noted previously, for
the mean sentence, by ethnicity, for quantities equal to or greater than 15g, Blacks
received the lowest mean sentence of 41.86 months. Whites received a mean sentence of
48.49 months while Hispanics received 55.18 months. In addition, 92.7% of all Blacks
plea bargained. Since a plea bargain seems to yield a lighter sentence, and as the
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overwhelming majority of subjects plea bargaining were minorities, this may explain the
lower coefficient.
In addition, the interaction between Black and Sell was not statistically significant
in this linear model. This may be due to the fact that, as noted Figure 2, the mean
sentence of all ethnicities for possession crimes varied by only about two weeks (t = 1029.498, p = 0.615). However, it yielded a p value of 0.055 which is close to being
significant. As such, the variable will be included in subsequent tables. For sales crimes,
the mean sentence for Whites exceeded Blacks by about eight months (t = -108.953, p <
0.0001) and the mean sentence for Whites exceeded Hispanics by about two months (t = 102.300, p < 0.0001). The co-mingling of mean sentences for ethnicities in this variable,
significant for sales crimes but not for possession crimes, produced a result that was not
statistically significant.
However, the interaction between Black and ≥ 15 g yielded an extra 10.830
months.
Being Hispanic did not produce a statistically significant difference in sentence
nor did the interaction effects.
The R Square value for this model equaled 0.239. This means that the model
accounts for only 24% of the variance in the dependent variable, sentence.
Grand Summary
Overall, trial convictions are significantly associated with a higher sentence than
plea bargain convictions. In the general linear models, a trial conviction resulted in a
positive, significant coefficient. Per results from analyzing this dataset, a trial tax exists
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in Cook County – plea bargainers tend to receive lesser sentences than those convicted at
trial.
Factoring out the impact of a sentence equal to zero, that is, receiving probation,
also showed a significant coefficient for measuring sentence. This variable elucidated
sentence by considering the fact that a sentence of zero skews the mean value for
sentence. As such, those receiving probation were not included in the general linear
model.
The seriousness of the crime, quantity and then possession vs. sales also yielded
an increased sentence as evidenced by the positive, significant coefficient.
Females received a significantly less sentence than males, but suffered an
increased sentence, just like their male counterparts, when convicted at trial. As such,
this study concluded that the controlling variable gender is associated with sentence. In
addition, the interaction between gender and conviction mode proved to be a good
predictor of sentence. Being female results in a lower sentence, period; however, that
gender reduction disappears for females convicted at trial. The sentence for male plea
bargainers was greater than that of their female counterparts, but both suffered increased
prison time for not plea bargaining.
In terms of ethnicity, only being Black yielded a significant result as did the
interaction between being Black and quantity. The following table illustrates a summary
of statistically significant predicted values.
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Table 28
Predicting Sentence Summary _______________
Predictor

Additional Sentence

Step 1 All Statutes, Defendants sentenced to prison
Constant

18.8 months

Trail Conviction

3.3 months

Sell

7.4 months

≥ 15 g

20.5 months

Female

-14.5 months

Female X Trial Conviction 11.4 months
Black
Black X Sell

-13.8 months
2.6 months

Black X ≥ 15 g
10.8 months
__________________________________________
The associated effect of being convicted at trial vs. plea bargaining, selling as
opposed to possessing narcotics, having the quantity involved be ≥ 15g not < 15g,
gender, the interaction between being female and convicted at trial, being Black and the
interaction effects of being Black may all be compared to a baseline sentence to obtain a
predicted sentence based on a convict’s inclusion in a particular subgroup. From that a
trial tax may be calculated.
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Table 29
Predicting Sentence by Gender for Possession Crimes Considering Quantity______
Possess < 15g

Possess ≥ 15g

Plea Bargain

Male

Female

Constant

18.8

18.8

Constant

0.0

-14.5

Female

18.8

4.3

Female
Sentence

≥ 15g
Sentence

Trial Conviction Male
Constant

Male

Female

18.8

18.8

0.0

-14.5

+20.5

+20.5

39.3

24.8

Female

Male

Female

18.8

18.8

18.8

18.8

Constant

0.0

-14.5

Female

0.0

-14.5

Trial Conviction +3.3

+3.3

Trial Conviction +3.3

+3.3

Female

Female X Trial
Conviction

Female X Trial
Conviction

0.0

+11.4

Sentence

22.1

19.0

≥ 15g

Trial Tax

3.3

14.7

Sentence

0.0

+11.4

+20.5

+20.5

42.6

39.5

Trial Tax
3.3
14.7
__________________________________________________________________
For plea bargained possession crimes of < 15g, males receive a sentence 14.5
months greater than their female counterparts, 18.8 vs. 4.3 months. For the same crime
but involving a trial conviction, males receive a sentence 3.1 months greater than females
in the same circumstance, 22.1 compared to 19.0 months. By not pleading guilty, the
female gender discount disappears. There is, in effect, an interaction effect.
Plea bargained possession crimes involving ≥ 15g produce similar results. Males
receive 39.1 compared to females’ 24.8 months, again due to the 14.5 month gender
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discount. For trial convictions, the comparative sentences become 42.6 months for males
and 39.5 months for females.
This results in a net trial tax, regardless of quantity, for men of 3.3 months.
However, females are hit hardest as the gender discount fades away due to the trial
conviction. By not pleading guilty, females lose their gender discount if convicted at
trial. This results in a net trial tax for females of 14.7 months.
The next table provides a similar display for sales crimes.
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Table 30
Predicting Sentence by Gender for Sales Crimes Considering Quantity__________
Selling < 15g
Plea Bargain

Male

Female

Constant

18.8

18.8

Sell

7.4

7.4

Female

0.0

-14.5

26.2

11.7

Sentence

Selling ≥ 15g
Male

Female

18.8

18.8

Sell

7.4

7.4

Female

0.0

-14.5

+20.5

+20.5

46.7

32.2

Constant

≥ 15g
Sentence

Trial Conviction Male
Constant

Female

Male

Female

18.8

18.8

Sell

7.4

7.4

18.8

18.8

Sell

7.4

7.4

Female

0.0

-14.5

Female

0.0

-14.5

Trial Conviction +3.3

+3.3

Trial Conviction +3.3

+3.3

Female X Trial
Conviction

Constant

Female X Trial
Conviction

0.0

+11.4

Sentence

29.5

26.4

≥ 15g

Trial Tax

3.3

14.7

Sentence

0.0

+11.4

+20.5

+20.5

50.0

46.9

Trial Tax
3.3
14.7
__________________________________________________________________
For plea bargained sales crimes of < 15g, males receive a sentence 14.5 months
greater than their female counterparts, 26.2 vs. 11.7 months. For the same crime but
involving a trial conviction, males receive a sentence 3.3 months greater than females in
the same circumstance, 29.5 compared to 26.4 months. Again, by not pleading guilty,
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females’ gender discount disappears. There is, again, an interaction tax that leads to
increased sentence.
Plea bargained sales crimes involving ≥ 15g produce similar results. Males
received 46.7 compared to females’ 32.2 months, again due to the 14.5 month gender
discount. For trial convictions, the comparative sentences become 50.0 months for males
and 46.9 months for females.
This results in a net trial tax, regardless of quantity, for men of 3.3 months.
However, females are hit hardest as the gender discount fades away due to the trial
conviction. By not pleading guilty, females lose their gender discount if convicted at
trial. This results in a net trial tax for females of 14.7 months.
This holds true regardless of the crime’s seriousness with regards to possessing
vs. selling and whether the quantity involved < 15 g or ≥ 15g.
The next table provides a similar comparison but based on ethnicity. Hispanics
were not included as that group did not produce any statistically significant results.
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Table 31
Predicting Sentence by Ethnicity for Possession Crimes Considering Quantity____
Possess < 15g
Plea Bargain
Constant
Black
Sentence

Possess ≥ 15g

Not Black

Black

Not Black

18.8

18.8

Constant

0.0

-13.8

18.8

5.0

18.8

18.8

Black

0.0

-13.8

≥ 15g

+20.5

+20.5

39.3

25.5

Sentence
Trial
Conviction

Not Black

Black

18.8

18.8

Constant

Trial Conviction +3.3
Black

Constant

Sentence

Not Black

Black_

18.8

18.8

+3.3

Trial Conviction +3.3

+3.3

0.0

-13.8

Black

0.0

-13.8

22.1

8.3

≥ 15g

+20.5

+20.5

0.0

+10.5

42.6

53.1

Black X ≥ 15g
Trial Tax

Black_

3.3

3.3

Sentence

Trial Tax
3.3
3.3
__________________________________________________________________
For plea bargained possession crimes of < 15g, non-Blacks receive a sentence of
18.8 months while Blacks received a 5.0 month sentence. For the same crime but
involving a trial conviction, Non Blacks receive a sentence 3.3 months greater than
Blacks in the same circumstance, 22.1 compared to 8.3 months. Ethnicity did not
associate with conviction mode so the trial tax remains the same regardless of ethnicity.
Plea bargained possession crimes involving ≥ 15g produce similar results. Non
Blacks received 22.1 compared to Blacks’ 8.3 months. For trial convictions, the
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comparative sentences become 42.6 months for non-Blacks, and 53.1 months for Blacks
due to the interaction effect of being Black and the crime involving the larger quantity of
≥ 15g. There again appears to be an interaction tax. This results in a net trial tax,
regardless of quantity or ethnicity of 3.3 months. Table 32 illustrates sales crimes.
Table 32
Predicting Sentence by Ethnicity for Sales Crimes Considering Quantity____
Selling < 15g
Plea Bargain
Constant
Black
Sell
Black X Sell
Sentence

Selling ≥ 15g

Not Black

Black

Not Black

18.8

18.8

Constant

0.0

-13.8

Black

+7.4

+7.4

Sell

0.0
26.2

18.8

18.8

0.0

-13.8

+7.4

+7.4

+2.6

Black X Sell 0.0

+2.6

15.0

≥ 15g

+20.5

+20.5

0.0
46.7

+10.5
46.0

Black X
≥ 15g
Sentence
Trial
Conviction

Black_

Not Black

Black

Not Black

Black_

18.8

18.8

Constant

18.8

18.8

Trial Conviction +3.3

+3.3

Trial Conviction +3.3

+3.3

Black

0.0

-13.8

Black

0.0

-13.8

Sell

7.4

7.4

+7.4

+7.4

Black X Sell

0.0

+2.6

Black X Sell

0.0

+2.6

29.5

18.3

≥ 15g

+20.5

+20.5

0.0

+10.5

50.0

49.3

Constant

Sentence

Sell

Black X ≥ 15g
Trial Tax

3.3

3.3

Sentence

Trial Tax
3.3
3.3
__________________________________________________________________
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For plea bargained sales crimes of < 15g, non-Blacks receive a sentence of 26.2
months while Blacks received a 15.0 month sentence. For the same crime but involving a
trial conviction, non-Blacks receive a sentence 11.2 months greater than Blacks in the
same circumstance, 29.5 compared to 18.3 months. Ethnicity did not associate with
conviction mode so the trial tax remains the same regardless of ethnicity.
Plea bargained sales crimes involving ≥ 15g produce similar results. Non Blacks
received 46.7 compared to Blacks’ 35.5 months. For trial convictions, the comparative
sentences become 50.0 months for non Blacks and 49.3 months for Blacks due to the
interaction effect of being Black and the crime involving the larger quantity of ≥ 15g.
There appears to be, again, an interaction tax. This results in a net trial tax, regardless of
quantity or ethnicity of 3.3 months.
The main lesson seems to be, regardless of crime, gender or ethnicity, criminal
defendants reap a bargain by pleading guilty. They may otherwise face a trial tax.
However, regardless of conviction mode there seems to be a “Black tax” but only in
terms of the interaction between being Black and selling and then between Black and the
crime involving ≥ 15g.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
This study began with the notion of a trial tax. Though no standard definition
exists, for the purposes of this research, the descriptions provided by Bogira (2005) who
characterize it as, “. . . the extra punishment a defendant may face merely by virtue of
exercising his right to trial.” and Ulmer and Bradley (2006) who declared it existed when,
“. . . defendants are substantially penalized if they exercise their right to a jury trial and
then lose.” were used.
No writings were found that debated its existence; indeed, the Illinois appellate
courts have openly discussed it. Some, however, notably the Alabama Sentencing
Commission, have debated its constitutionality on the grounds that utilizing a
Constitutional right should not impair one’s liberty.
This runs counter to the concept of plea bargaining, a legal tool affirmed by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Brady vs. U.S. (1970) and Santobello vs. U.S. (1971). If a
defendant pleads guilty to an offense, they get a bargain in the form of a lesser sentence.
The Court openly encouraged plea bargaining on the basis it creates a speedier court
docket, lowers operating expenses for the courts and may indicate a defendant’s greater
likelihood to reform via their acceptance of responsibility. According to King (2005), the

75

76
U.S. Sentencing Commission openly declared that plea bargains should generate a
“sentence discount” for acceptance of responsibility.
Langer (2006), however, argued that plea bargaining creates de facto unilateral
adjudication where prosecutors may solely decide guilt or innocence through coercive
plea bargains, thus effectively denying the defendant of the right to due process.
Finkelstein (1975) wrote of finding evidence that, “. . . pressures to plead guilty have
been used to secure convictions that could not otherwise be obtained.” Bibas (2004)
noted that low income defendants may be assigned a public defender handling a large
caseload. Counsel for defense would have personal incentive to plea bargain the case,
again effectively denying due process. Regardless, Kinsley (2002) estimated that almost
95% of all criminal cases in the U.S. are settled by plea bargaining over going to trial.
Plea bargaining will remain in the legal landscape for sometime. By default it
appears the trial tax will also. This study examined whether the trial tax existed, to a
statistically significant degree, for cocaine and heroin crimes in Cook County, Illinois.
This was accomplished by comparing sentences based on whether the defendant plea
bargained or lost at trial. It then attempted to measure that degree while controlling for
contextual variables such as gender, ethnicity, crime seriousness, drug quantity along
with interaction effects.
Data and Analyses
Data was received from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois after
submission of a Freedom of Information Act request. The records of 12,786 offenders
who plead guilty or were convicted at trial for cocaine or heroin offenses were used. All
subjects were initially charged in 2004, 2005 or 2006 with sentence being passed no later
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than the end of 2007. All information obtained remains a matter of public record
available to anyone who requests it. However, by request, no personal identifiers such as
name or driver’s license number were included in the dataset.
Throughout this research, the single dependent variable was sentence, in months.
Independent variables included conviction mode, whether the defendant received
probation or not, gender, ethnicity, crime seriousness, quantity and interaction effect
variables.
Chi-square tests were used in this study to check for significant associations
between categorical variables. Two-sample t-tests were performed to test for significant
differences between means. Two-way ANOVA assessments were run to examine the
possible interaction effect of independent variables. Finally, general linear models were
developed in an attempt to measure any statistically significant associations.
Discussion of Findings Related to Trial Tax Existence
The mean sentence for the dataset used in this study equaled 25.36 months.
Those convicted at trial received a mean sentence of 32.17 months compared to the plea
bargainers who received a mean sentence of 24.86 months. That results in a 23% less
and a statistically significant difference between groups. The trial tax does exist in Cook
County, Illinois as far as this dataset is concerned.
In her study, King (2005) found evidence of a trial tax using data from Kansas,
Maryland, Minnesota, Pennsylvania and Washington. Only in Washington State was
there not a statistically significant difference between sentence and conviction modes.
Overall, however, King found, “. . . a significant plea discount – the difference between
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the average sentence given after a guilty verdict and the average sentence given after a
guilty plea for the same offense . . .”
Ulmer and Bradley (2006) found the same effect in that, “. . . the odds of
incarceration following a bench trial are roughly 2.2 times the odds for guilty plea, while
a jury trial conviction has roughly 2.7 times the incarceration odds of a guilty plea.”
They concluded that, “Overall, then, conviction by trial, especially jury trial, carries a
meaningful additional sentencing penalty . . .”
Discussion of Findings Related to Contextual Variables
This study found that gender is not associated with conviction mode but it is to
sentence length. Females receive a lighter sentence, period, but not so light a sentence if
convicted at trial. In this study, women received a trial tax of 10.4 months compared to
4.5 months for men. This was due, primarily, to interaction of gender and conviction
mode. By not pleading guilty women tended to lose their gender discount. Johnson
(2003) came to the conclusion that female offenders were more likely to receive a
downward departure in their sentence than males.
Unlike gender, ethnicity was significantly associated with conviction mode and
sentence but no interaction effect was found. Blacks received a 4.5 month trial tax, the
same as Whites, for crimes involving < 15g. However, once the crime involved ≥ 15g,
the trail tax for Blacks increased to 5.4 months. Johnson found that Blacks had a 25%
less chance of receiving a downward departure than Whites, and Hispanics were 56% less
likely than whites to receive this benefit.
Comparing Blacks to Whites, this study found that Blacks were more often
convicted of and received more hefty sentences for the more serious crime of sales. For
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quantity, however, more Whites than Blacks were convicted of the larger amount and
Whites received a greater sentence than their Black, greater quantity counterparts. This
study discovered an interaction effect between ethnicity and quantity.
Discussion of Findings Related to Measuring Associations
Females faced a trial tax of 10.4 months, compared to 4.5 months for males. This
was due, however, to a reduction in gender discount from 8.8 months to 2.9 months that
came with a trial conviction. This was due to the gender and conviction mode interaction
effect as it related to sentence.
Blacks and Whites received the same trial tax of 4.5 months for crimes involving
< 15g, regardless of whether it related to possession or sales. Once the larger quantity of
≥ 15g was reached, however, Blacks received a net trial tax of 5.4 months while Whites
maintained 4.5 months. This was due to the ethnicity and quantity interaction effect as it
related to sentence. The negative coefficient for Black went from 4.8 to 3.9 using this
interaction variable.
Limitations
The study is limited to heroin and cocaine crimes committed in Cook County,
Illinois from 2004 to 2006. The results may not be extrapolated to other crimes where a
defendant may be more or less likely to go to trial. Ulmer and Bradley (2006) found that
violent crime defendants were two times more likely to go to trial than non-violent
defendants. Beyond that, all limitations were related to using sentence as the dependent
variable.
This study made no account for a defendant’s criminal history. Traditional
wisdom suggests that having a criminal history would lead to a longer sentence.
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However, Johnson (2003) found that those with more criminal experience were more
likely to receive a shorter sentence. Ulmer and Bradley (2006) determined that, “. . . the
jury trial penalty decreases as the prior record score of the defendant increases.” In spite
of not agreeing with traditional wisdom, criminal history may be associated with sentence
length.
Certain characteristics of the dataset may tend to dominate the analyses. Most of
the convictions were for smaller quantities, < 15g. In addition, the dataset is dominated
by Blacks and males.
The R Square value for this model equaled 0.239. This means that the model
accounts for only 24% of the variance in the dependent variable, sentence. There are
other factors impacting sentence not accounted for by the linear model utilized. Another
study may be performed to explain that variance.
This dataset did not allow for determining a defendant’s socioeconomic status or
the type of counsel they may have employed, private or public defender. As noted by
Bibas (2004), if they had a public defender they may be more likely to plea bargain than
work to have charges dismissed or provide a rigorous defense at trial. A top-notch
defense attorney may provide expertise available only to those who can afford it.
There was no way in this study to account for victim characteristics that may lead
to a stiffer sentence, i.e. if the victim was a child or elderly person. King (2005) noted
that some factors, relating to higher sentences, may be a judge’s emotional reaction to
victim testimony, public scrutiny that accompanies trials, or the “human” perspective of
the judge that going to trial demonstrates an inherent lack of remorse on the defendant’s
part.
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Implications and Recommendations for Future Research
This research will be a part of Drug Possession Impact Study by the Institute for
Metropolitan Affairs scheduled for a late 2010 publication. The results may be used for
policy development related to the alleged penalization of the constitutional right to a jury
trial.
It may serve as the foundation for future, larger scale research such as an Illinois
wide study or another in Cook County but including all crimes. A study may be
performed to determine if public defender attorneys are more likely to have their clients
plea bargain than private counsel.
In the spirit of Ulmer & Bradley (2006) and King (2005) an examination could be
performed to study the association between criminal history and sentence. Also using
those same studies research could be done on the association between sentence and jury
trial vs. bench trial sentences. King (2005) found that, “. . . waiving a jury in favor of a
bench trial has less consistent punishment consequences.”
A qualitative study interviewing judges regarding their feelings about those who
go to trial compared to plea bargaining, in terms of accepting responsibility and remorse
could also be performed.
Conclusion
Plea bargaining and the trial tax will not soon disappear from our legal system.
Studies regarding their impact will inspire debate about their constitutionality and overall
fairness. The debate may never be settled but it appears that if a defendant is guilty and
given the option to plea bargain, pleading guilty will be rewarded with a lighter sentence.

APPENDIX A:
GENERAL LINEAR MODELS
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The below equations represent White male plea bargainers.
White male plea bargainer for possession of < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + e
White male plea bargainer for selling < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β2)(Sell) + e
White male plea bargainer for possessing ≥ 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + e
White male plea bargainer for selling ≥ 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + e
The below equations represent White males who were convicted at trial.
White male trial convicted for possession of < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + e
White male trial convicted for selling < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β2)(Sell) + e
White male trial convicted for possessing ≥ 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β3)(≥ 15g) + e
White male trial convicted for selling ≥ 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + e
The below equations symbolize White female plea bargainers.
White female plea bargainer for possession of < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β4)(Female) + e
White female plea bargainer for selling < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β4)(Female) + (β2)(Sell) + e
White female plea bargainer for possessing ≥ 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β4)(Female) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + e
White female plea bargainer for selling ≥ 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β4)(Female) + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)(≥ 15g) + e
The below equations correspond to White females who were convicted at trial.
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White female plea bargainer for possession of < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β4)(Female) + e
White female plea bargainer for selling < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β4)(Female) + (β2)(Sell) + e
White female plea bargainer for possessing ≥ 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β4)(Female) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + e
White female plea bargainer for selling ≥ 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β4)(Female) + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)(≥ 15g) + e
The below equations represent Black male plea bargainers.
Black male plea bargainer for possession of < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β6)(Black) + e
Black male plea bargainer for selling < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β2)(Sell) + (β6)(Black) + (β8)(Black * Sell) + e
Black male plea bargainer for possessing ≥ 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β6)(Black) + (β10)(Black * ≥ 15g) + e
Black male plea bargainer for selling ≥ 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β6)(Black) + (β8)(Black * Sell) + (β10)(Black * ≥
15g) + e
The below equations characterize Black males who were convicted at trial.
Black male trial convicted for possession of < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β6)(Black) + e
Black male trial convicted for selling < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β2)(Sell) + (β6)(Black) + (β8)(Black * Sell) + e
Black male trial convicted for possessing ≥ 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β3)(≥ 15g) + (β6)(Black) + (β10)(Black * ≥ 15g) + e
Black male trial convicted for selling ≥ 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β6)(Black) + (β8)(Black *
Sell) + (β10)(Black * ≥ 15g) + e
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The below models correspond to Black female plea bargainers.
Black female plea bargainer for possession of < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) + (β6)(Black) + e
Black female plea bargainer for selling < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β2)(Sell) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) + (β6)(Black) +
(β8)(Black * Sell) + e
Black female plea bargainer for possessing ≥ 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) + (β6)(Black) +
(β10)(Black * ≥ 15g) + e
Black female plea bargainer for selling ≥ 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) +
(β6)(Black) + (β8)(Black * Sell) + (β10)(Black * ≥ 15g) + e
The below models correspond to Black females convicted at trial.
Black female trial convicted for possession of < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) +
(β6)(Black) + e
Black female trial convicted for selling < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) +
(β2)(Sell) + (β6)(Black) + (β8)(Black * Sell) + e
Black female trial convicted for possessing ≥ 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β3)(≥ 15g) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial
Conviction) + (β6)(Black) + (β10)(Black * ≥ 15g) + e
Black female trial convicted for selling ≥ 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female
* Trial Conviction) (β6)(Black) + (β8)(Black * Sell) + (β10)(Black * ≥ 15g) + e
The below equations represent Hispanic male plea bargainers.
Hispanic male plea bargainer for possession of < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β7)(Hispanic) + e
Hispanic male plea bargainer for selling < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β2)(Sell) + (β7)(Hispanic) + (β9)(Hispanic * Sell) + e
Hispanic male plea bargainer for possessing ≥ 15g:
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Y’ = β0 + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β7)(Hispanic) + (β11)(Hispanic * ≥ 15g) + e
Hispanic male plea bargainer for selling ≥ 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β7)(Hispanic) + (β9)(Hispanic * Sell) +
(β11)(Hispanic * ≥ 15g) + e
The below equations represent Hispanic males who were convicted at trial.
Hispanic male trial convicted for possession of < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β7)(Hispanic) + e
Hispanic male trial convicted for selling < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β2)(Sell) + (β7)(Hispanic) + (β9)(Hispanic * Sell) + e
Hispanic male trial convicted for possessing ≥ 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β3)(≥ 15g) + (β7)(Hispanic) + (β11)(Hispanic * ≥
15g) + e
Hispanic male trial convicted for selling ≥ 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β7)(Hispanic) +
(β9)(Hispanic * Sell) + (β11)(Hispanic * ≥ 15g) + e
The below models characterize Hispanic female plea bargainers.
Hispanic female plea bargainer for possession of < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) + (β7)(Hispanic) + e
Hispanic female plea bargainer for selling < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β2)(Sell) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) + (β7)(Hispanic) +
(β9)(Hispanic * Sell) + e
Hispanic female plea bargainer for possessing ≥ 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) + (β7)(Hispanic)
+ (β11)(Hispanic * ≥ 15g) + e
Hispanic female plea bargainer for selling ≥ 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) +
(β7)(Hispanic) + (β9)(Hispanic * Sell) + (β11)(Hispanic * ≥ 15g) + e
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The below models characterize Hispanic females convicted at trial.
Hispanic female trial convicted for possession of < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial Conviction) +
(β7)(Hispanic) + e
Hispanic female trial convicted for selling < 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β2)(Sell) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial
Conviction) + (β7)(Hispanic) + (β9)(Hispanic * Sell) + e
Hispanic female trial convicted for possessing ≥ 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β3)(≥ 15g) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female * Trial
Conviction) + (β7)(Hispanic) + (β11)(Hispanic * ≥ 15g) + e
Hispanic female trial convicted for selling ≥ 15g:
Y’ = β0 + (β1)(Trial Conviction) + (β2)(Sell) + (β3)( ≥ 15g) + (β4)(Female) + (β5)(Female
* Trial Conviction) + (β7)(Hispanic) + (β9)(Hispanic * Sell) + (β11)(Hispanic * ≥ 15g) +
e
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